EU Strategic Autonomy and the Taiwan Strait: A Tipping Point or Talking Point?

As the Indo-Pacific tilts toward geopolitical turbulence, the European Union’s long-standing ambition for “strategic autonomy” is once again under scrutiny. At the heart of this test lies an unlikely trigger thousands of kilometers away: the Taiwan Strait.

China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan has become more than a regional flashpoint—it’s a vessel for international alignments. With the United States doubling down on deterrence through arms sales and military deployments, and Japan reorienting its defense strategy to meet a potential Taiwan contingency, the EU faces a reckoning. Can it maintain a distinct geopolitical identity without undermining transatlantic unity or jeopardizing its economic ties with China?

Strategic Autonomy: Goal Years in the Making

The idea of strategic autonomy gained traction in the EU lexicon after the 2016 EU Global Strategy declared the Union must be able to “act autonomously when and where necessary.” At its core, this vision seeks to reduce dependence on external actors, namely the United States, for security, critical technologies, and supply chains. It has since evolved into a pillar of the European Commission’s rhetoric under Ursula von der Leyen, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, US-China rivalry, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While strategic autonomy is often spoken of as an “EU position,” the reality is more complex. The European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has emphasized the concept in speeches and policy papers, but ultimate foreign policy decisions rest with the European Council — meaning unanimity among 27 states. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs coordinates positions, but without member state consensus, Commission rhetoric cannot be translated into decisive action. This institutional separation limits Brussels’ ability to respond quickly to a Taiwan contingency.

Yet while the war in Ukraine provided moral clarity and spurred significant defense coordination among EU member states, the Taiwan issue exposes the limits of the EU’s strategic ambition in a very different realm: the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan: From Peripheral to Pivotal

Europe’s economic entanglement with China, coupled with its reliance on Taiwan for advanced semiconductors, makes stability in the Taiwan Strait a matter of strategic interest. According to the European Commission, over 40% of the world’s merchant shipping passes through the South China Sea, and Taiwan’s TSMC produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips.

Any disruption in this corridor would have massive repercussions for Europe’s tech and manufacturing sectors. As such, maintaining “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” has become formulaic language in EU-China summits and Indo-Pacific strategy documents. But the EU has largely stopped short of issuing forceful political or military commitments to Taiwan.

The American Anchor

Washington, by contrast, has taken a far more assertive stance. The Biden administration approved multiple arms packages to Taiwan, and key figures in Congress have increasingly framed Taiwan’s defense as vital to US credibility. In the Indo‑Pacific Strategy unveiled on February 11, 2022, the U.S. explicitly designated Taiwan as a leading democracy and key partner in the Indo‑Pacific, committing to deepen bilateral engagement and strengthen cooperation to uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait

This divergence raises uncomfortable questions for the EU. If a Taiwan crisis erupts, either through miscalculation or deliberate escalation, what role can or should Europe play? For now, the EU’s Indo-Pacific engagements have centered on naval diplomacy, with France, Germany, and the Netherlands conducting symbolic freedom of navigation patrols. Yet these gestures are far from a cohesive or credible deterrent.

Looking ahead, the EU faces several possible courses of action should cross-strait tensions escalate:

1. Transatlantic Alignment – Join U.S.-led sanctions, export controls, and naval deployments; likely to gain Eastern European support but strain economic ties with China.

2. Mediating Power – Offer to facilitate dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, leveraging economic ties with China and democratic solidarity with Taiwan; risks irrelevance if hard power dominates events.

3. Economic Shielding – Focus on rapid supply chain diversification, semiconductor stockpiling, and activating the EU’s anti-coercion instrument; mitigates economic fallout but avoids direct security commitments.

Each path carries distinct legal considerations, including the requirement for unanimity in the Council on foreign policy measures and potential WTO disputes over trade restrictions.

According to Dr. Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Europe must move beyond rhetorical ambition toward a real readiness to act, particularly as tensions escalate in the Indo‑Pacific. In her May 2025 discussion with CSIS, she warned that strategic autonomy must be more than a slogan and must translate into concrete capabilities and decisions CSIS.

Between Berlin and Vilnius

Internal divisions within the EU are encapsulated in the Lithuania–China dispute. In November 2021, Lithuania’s opening of a “Taiwanese Representative Office” in Vilnius led to immediate and sweeping informal sanctions from Beijing amounting to a de facto trade embargo. The EU responded by filing a WTO case in January 2022. Though the case was paused amid legal challenges, the European Commission in January 2025 formally moved to resume the case, signaling persistence in contesting economic coercion. Meanwhile, in April 2025, talks on restoring diplomatic status with China resumed, but Lithuania made clear it will not change the name of the Taiwan office, underscoring the principles at stake.

Beijing has repeatedly exploited these differences through a divide-and-conquer strategy, using selective economic incentives and targeted retaliation to influence individual member states. From port investments in Southern Europe to car market access for Germany and luxury goods imports from France, China tailors its leverage to the political and economic priorities of each country. This approach not only deters collective EU action but also tests the credibility of the strategic autonomy doctrine.

Germany, France, and Italy, the EU’s economic heavyweights, have taken a more cautious tone. Germany has consistently stressed the importance of balancing firm diplomacy with China alongside safeguarding economic ties. During his April 2023 state visit to China, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that Europe should not become a follower in the U.S.–China duel over Taiwan, cautioning against adapting to an “American rhythm or a Chinese overreaction.” He emphasized that Europe must reduce its dependence on the extraterritoriality of the U.S. dollar, arguing that without mobilizing its own strategic autonomy, the EU risks becoming vassals, unable to finance independent policies or respond to crises not of its own making. 

Beyond the largest economies, other member states approach Taiwan through different lenses. Poland, viewing China alongside Russia as part of a broader authoritarian challenge, aligns closely with U.S. deterrence efforts. Spain tends to prioritize commercial relations and often favors non-confrontational diplomacy toward Beijing. The Netherlands, as a major high-tech and semiconductor equipment exporter, is increasingly alert to supply chain vulnerabilities and has tightened export controls on advanced lithography machines, moves that have drawn Beijing’s ire. These divergent perspectives further complicate a unified EU position.

Macron’s remarks drew backlash in Washington and capitals across Eastern Europe, where fears of Chinese and Russian revisionism run deep. But they also highlighted the core dilemma: is the EU ready to define a non-aligned strategic position or is it merely evading a definite answer?

Chips and Supply Chains

Beyond geopolitics, Europe’s Taiwan dilemma is also economic. The European Chips Act, adopted in 2023, explicitly mentions the need to diversify and secure semiconductor supply chains. Taiwan’s dominance in this space, especially through TSMC, makes it both a partner and a vulnerability.

In recent years, the EU has intensified its dialogue with Taiwan on semiconductor supply chains, especially through the EU–Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue launched in 2021. While no formal agreement has been signed as of 2025, the dialogue covers critical areas including chips, supply chain resilience, and digital innovation, reflecting shared strategic interests but falling short of a formal partnership or security alignment.

China, meanwhile, has warned that deepening ties with Taiwan crosses its “red lines.” Given the EU’s €586 billion trade with China, economic retaliation remains a real concern.

Talking Point or Turning Point?

The Taiwan question has thus become a litmus test for the EU’s broader strategic posture. As NATO debates whether to open a liaison office in Tokyo and the G7 continues to issue unified statements on Taiwan, Europe cannot afford to sit idly on the sidelines. At the same time, overly close alignment with US-led containment risks derailing Europe’s climate and trade agenda with China—a balancing act that Brussels has yet to master.

So far, strategic autonomy has served as a useful rhetorical umbrella, allowing the EU to pursue resilience without confrontation, and partnership without dependency. But the Taiwan Strait may prove less forgiving. Unlike Ukraine, Europe has few historical or security obligations toward Taiwan. But the economic and systemic consequences of a crisis would be no less profound.

As tensions mount and the possibility of a cross-strait conflict no longer seems remote, the EU may soon find that its cherished doctrine of strategic autonomy faces a defining test, not in Brussels, but in the waters off Taipei.

Whether it meets that test with coherence or confusion will determine whether strategic autonomy remains a European talking point or becomes a geopolitical turning point.