How Can Europe Make Itself More Relevant in the Middle East?

Europe, once a dominant force in the Middle East after World War I, with remnants of its influence extending to recent times, for example, thanks to France’s far-reaching influence through former President Jacques Chirac, now finds itself sidelined in a region shaped for the most part by the actions of the United States, Russia, and China. Over the past couple of decades, the EU and key foreign policy actors like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have struggled to define a coherent and impactful role. Amidst regional instability, strategic competition, and a shifting global order, Europe faces a pressing question: how can it make itself more relevant in the Middle East?

The Reality of European Marginalisation

The decline of European influence in the Middle East is especially apparent when compared to the actions of competing global powers. While Russia has asserted its presence through military force - as was the case in Syria during Assad’s reign - and China expands its footprint through economic and technological development, European states have mostly relied on soft power, yielding limited results. The European response to key regional crises - Iraq, Libya, ISIS, Syria, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - has either been ineffective or largely dictated by US foreign policy. Internal contradictions, lack of coordination, and diminishing hard-power capabilities have all contributed to Europe’s diplomatic ineptitude. Even efforts from formerly influential states, at least on a regional level, like Italy in the Libyan civil war, or France’s attempts to act a counterbalance to US influence in the region, have fallen flat. Similarly, European investments in the peace process between Israel and Palestine have not altered the trajectory of seemingly irreversible deterioration. Such failures underscore the limitations of Europe’s fragmented, nation-based approach in a region that responds more to hard power and unified strategy than to well-meaning but disjointed diplomacy.

Strategic Interests Still Matter

Despite its weakened position, Europe has vital interests in the Middle East. Chief among them is preventing geopolitical instability that could lead to additional waves of mass migration - an issue that threatens to further strain the already fragile political dynamics in Europe. The migration flows that followed the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 contributed enormously to the meteoric rise of far-right, anti-immigration parties across Europe. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Germany, with the surging popularity of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). More broadly, there are also economic incentives for Europe in the region. Italy’s Piano Mattei, a strategic economic plan aimed at fostering mutually beneficial partnerships with African countries through investments in energy, infrastructure, and trade, is an example of Europe’s moves in the region. The plan aims to deepen Italy’s role in 14 African countries, including Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. It sets out to do so by securing energy contracts and creating local economic opportunities that counter the push factors driving migration. Rather than relying on traditional aid models, it offers targeted financial backing, technical expertise, and advantageous trade relations to encourage sustainable growth. Through this approach, Italy is working to secure its own strategic interests while presenting itself as a trusted partner in the region’s development as well as a vital link between the African continent and Europe.

Where Europe Can Act

Despite its relative weakness there are still some areas where Europe can make its voice heard. An isolationist US administration and a Russia weakened by the ongoing war in Ukraine translate into a window of opportunity for the bloc to increase its influence in the region.

1.     A Realistic Iran Nuclear Policy

European powers - especially the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) - must leverage their diplomatic ties with both Washington and Tehran to support measures that deter Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. Their role in the context of the ongoing talks between Iran and the US could prove to be mediatory in nature, especially in light of the recent delay in negotiations between the two parties. Even though Europe lacks the military leverage to impose red lines, it can play a crucial role in advocating for mechanisms like the UN “snapback” sanctions to bolster moderates in Tehran and constrain the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US could benefit from this and see the E3 as a way to put more pressure on Iran in order to reach a deal. Europe’s proximity to Iran and its vulnerability to Iran’s military ambitions - like the IRGC’s aim for 10,000 km strike capability - give it a clear stake. But diplomacy must be backed with clear, enforceable consequences if Tehran oversteps.

2.     Countering the “Axis of Resistance”

Although the country finds itself weakened following Israel’s offensive actions and the fall of the Assad regime, Iran’s “Muqawama Doctrine” is not to be underestimated. Envisaged by General Qassem Soleimani, killed by a US drone strike in 2020, it seeks to encircle Israel and dominate the Levant via proxy militias. This threatens not only Israeli security but regional stability - affecting Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and especially Iraq. Europe should collaborate more with the United States to prevent Iran from turning Iraq into a client state. Economic aid should be directed to support political forces in Baghdad that oppose Iranian influence. Even controversial figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr - a radical Iraqi cleric whose Shiite militia forces fought against US and Iraqi troops from 2004 to 2008 - could be seen as potential partners to counter Iranian influence. Preventing Iraq from falling entirely under Iranian influence would also complicate Tehran’s bid to establish overland supply routes westwards towards the Mediterranean. It has been reported that European officials are considering the deployment of small troop contingents, in part to signal commitment to ensuring regional stability and to dissuade Washington from a full military withdrawal.

3.     Reviving the Palestinian Authority

As one of the largest donors to the Palestinian Authority (PA), Europe finds itself in a unique position. Within the broader context of the potential for a two-state solution, Europe should use this leverage to keep demanding serious reform within the PA. Following the first ever High-Level Political Dialogue between the European Union and the PA, which took place in April of this year, the EU has proposed a multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme worth up to €1.6 billion. The objective of the Programme is to build towards a sustainable peace based on the Two-State solution. The majority of the disbursements “will be linked to the Palestinian Authority’s progress on key reforms in the areas of fiscal sustainability, democratic governance, private sector development and infrastructure and public services”. Conditioning future aid on anti-corruption governance reforms and the appointment of capable, technocratic leadership could help stave off the PA’s collapse and prepare it to govern a post-Hamas Gaza.

4.     A Balanced Approach to Israel

Despite internal divisions within the EU on how to deal with the situation in Gaza, a unified European position must press Israel towards finding a durable resolution to end the conflict. However, it is precisely the difference in positions that makes this fourth point perhaps the most complicated for the EU to address. What it can do though is increase coordination with a reformed PA and push for the suspension of Israeli settlement expansion - a move it backed up by unanimously imposing sanctions on Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank for the first time in April 2024. In fact, looking forward pressure should continue to target illegal settler violence – a matter that bears little ambiguity in the eyes of EU Member States. Another point to be discussed, still very much in its infancy, is the prospect of negotiating potential, future terms for Palestinian labour access to Israel. Whilst unthinkable for many in both Israel and Palestine at the moment, this was once a mutually beneficial arrangement that provided income and employment opportunities for Palestinians and a vital labour force for key Israeli industries such as construction and agriculture. Reintroducing such an arrangement - albeit within a markedly different political and security context - could help support economic stabilisation and encourage a sense of mutual interdependence.

In sum, Europe’s capacity to act effectively in the Middle East ultimately hinges on its ability to unify. Fragmented national approaches, epitomised in the disjointed Libya intervention, have led to failure and irrelevance. What is needed is a coordinated European foreign policy in the region, supported by increased military and aid spending coupled with a willingness to project limited but strategic hard power. The UK and France are particularly well-positioned to lead the continent’s efforts thanks to their historic presence and activities in the region and to their bilateral strategic relations with the US. Having said this, Europe’s path forward in the Middle East greatly depends on its volatile relationship with Uncle Sam. Transatlantic ties are fraying under the weight of divergent priorities - Ukraine, China, trade - and the current isolationist administration is not likely to acquiesce to European requests for its presence in the region. Thus, Europe must develop the capability to act independently, not just as a passive participant.