The Roots of a Coming Strategic Collision:The Rising Risk of a Turkey-Russia Regional Rivalry

The early 21st century has witnessed the revival of competing visions for Eurasia as both a geographic and civilizational space.  At the forefront are two, ambitious state-driven projects:  Turkey's "Strategic Depth" doctrine developed by academic-turned-policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Russia's "Neo-Eurasianism" heavily influenced by the philosopher Aleksandr Dugin.  Though both visions challenge Western hegemony and envision a post-liberal order, each represents a fundamentally different framework for organizing power across Eurasia.  Turkey's push to become a more prominent regional actor undermines Russia's civilizational monopoly over the Eurasian landmass. Although neither are currently policymakers, the ideas of Davutoglu and Dugin continue to echo in the ambitions and anxieties that define Ankara and Moscow's conduct in Eurasia.  This article explores the ideological roots, geopolitical trajectories, and real-world frictions driving these two competing Eurasian strategies.

Competing Visions

Even though each thinker has to some extent fallen out of favor with their respective governments, their ideas have left a lasting impact on the geopolitical strategies of their countries. Davutoglu, formerly a foreign policy advisor to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has since stepped away from public office and returned to a hybrid role in academia to further develop his theories. Dugin, on the other hand, continues to write and publish while remaining active on the periphery of Russia's political scene.  Both proposed their ideas through monographs.

Ahmet Davutoglu's 2001 book, Strategic Depth, laid out a framework for Turkey to reclaim geopolitical influence commensurate with its geography and imperial legacy. The doctrine urges Turkey to engage deeply in regions historically connected to the Ottoman Empire, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, while also leveraging its strategic location between Europe and Asia.  It is an approach that blends overtones of soft power with unsentimental calculations of realpolitik.

Ankara has expanded its influence in the region through military-industrial exports (chiefly unmanned aerial vehicles/"drones"), economic interdependence, and the pan-Turkic forum, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).  While Turkish media, religious institutions, and humanitarian agencies extend Ankara's reach into Central Asia and its environs, energy projects like the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gap Pipeline (TANAP) and lucrative defense cooperation arrangements with countries like Azerbaijan showcase Turkey's ambition to act as a hub of Eurasian activity.

Alternatively, Aleksandr Dugin's vision for Russia considers Moscow as the heart of a civilizational bloc defined by Orthodox Christianity, Slavic heritage, and a resistance to (institutional and conceptual) Western liberalism.  The Eurasia portrayed in Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics does not refer merely to the physical landmass, but is more of an ideological and spiritual alternative to so-called "Atlanticism". Dugin argues in his work for a multipolar world in which Russia leads a land-based empire, pushing back the maritime powers of NATO and the United States.

In Dugin's estimation, Turkey is a potential partner - but only as a junior player subordinated to Russian influence.  He views any semblance of "pan-Turkism" with suspicion, fearing it would fragment the Russian-led civilizational unity needed to construct a Eurasia sufficiently strong enough to counter-balance the West.

Turkish-Russian Competition: Current State of Affairs

Turkey's growing cultural, economic, and military ties with the Turkic-speaking states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan directly challenges Russia's post-Soviet influence.  Through initiatives like OTS, Ankara promotes a pan-Turkic identity in the region as a clear alternative to Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  Due to Turkey's NATO membership, Dugin interprets this as a Western-aligned subversion of Eurasian unity and a threat to the spiritual and strategic coherence of a Russian-led order.  A growing presence of Turkish businesses, schools, and media outlets in Central Asia is interpreted in Moscow as soft power encroachment by Ankara.

However, it was Turkey's military support of Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war that marked a turning point in the region's dynamics.  In doing so, the balance of power in the South Caucasus was shifted in favor of Turkey - who is now perceived as a co-guarantor of regional stability, thereby diminishing Russia's role as the sole arbiter in the region.  More telling was the fact that Turkey's assertiveness in that instance demonstrated the extent of erosion in Russia's traditional monopoly over the Caucasus.  Additionally, it exposed a limitation of Duginist thought: the presumption that Russia's regional influence is immutable. Turkey's successful use of drones, military advisors on the ground, and creative diplomatic leverage via the OTS showed there was a new path of power projection in Eurasia.

If Turkey’s assertiveness in 2020 left any doubt about its regional ambitions, its support for Ukraine in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion dispelled it completely. In response, Russia has made clear that its irredentist claims on Ukraine remain a proverbial "red line" issue in Russia's sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Ankara has continued to give full-throated support of Kyiv's sovereignty - both rhetorically and militarily.  Indeed, Turkey's "Bayraktar" drones became symbols of Ukrainian resilience in the early stages of the war as they foiled Russian military strategy.  And more recently, Ankara brokered the "Black Sea Grain Initiative" which facilitated Ukrainian grain exports despite Russian attempts to weaponize food supplies - further bolstering Turkey's presence in the region's affairs. 

But this rivalry now extends beyond the confines of Eurasia and has led to overt proxy clashes in places like the Middle East.  For example, Russia has long backed the Assad regime in Syria.  However, Ankara supports several rebel factions which seek to prevent Kurdish autonomy near its border.  A 2020 incident in which Turkish soldiers were killed by Assad's forces -- with the implicit backing of Russia - only deepened the growing antagonism between the two powers.  Turkey has since exercised influence - consistently and quietly - in places like Libya, Sudan, and the Gulf as part of its broader Middle East policy.  Such moves make it increasingly clear that Ankara is positioning itself as a power with ambitions across the Islamic world - and in direct competition with both Russia and a Shiite-dominated Iran.

Ultimately, Turkish-Russian competition in Eurasia goes beyond short-term geopolitical sparring.  It springs from a deeper contest rooted in civilizational identity and the drive for regional supremacy.  Dugin's Eurasianism is rooted in an Orthodox-Slavic society that allows for selective alliances, but not co-equal partners.  Turkey, under "Strategic Depth", promotes a Sunni Islamic and pan-Turkic vision that has little interest in subordinating itself and represents a doubly-appealing "secular-and-sectarian" alternative to long-standing Russian power projection. 

Both of these Eurasian identities are mutually exclusive, they both reject liberal internationalism, and they both cannot agree on what should replace it. A Russia increasingly isolated by the West cannot afford open hostility with Turkey.  Yet the more assertive Ankara becomes, the more likely Moscow will perceive it as an abiding strategic adversary.

Enter China:  A beneficiary or an arbitrator?

Amid the growing competition between Russia and Turkey, there is also the growing sense of an awkward dance underway between Russia and the guarantor of Turkey's security through NATO - the U.S.  And as troubling as the current dynamics already are, the emergence of a third great power in the Eurasian contest is far from unthinkable. China, after all, has its own strategic interests in the region.

The most obvious of these is in securing (and expanding) the existing infrastructure China has already provided throughout Central Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  The instability resulting from a protracted Turkish-Russian rivalry would result - at a minimum - in supply chain disruptions (particularly rail routes through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea) and also needlessly complicate those bilateral relationships needed by Beijing for BRI completion - yet courted by both Ankara and Moscow as they seek local favor in their competition.

China might insert itself into this dynamic if it views itself as the ultimate beneficiary of this rivalry.  It could do so by expanding its own footprint throughout Central Asia as a "neutral" alternative to regional infighting and positioning itself as a stabilizing investor. A less palatable outcome of Chinese involvement - and a sizeable risk -- would be for China to be drawn into more active mediation between these rivals - effectively choosing sides - and alienating at least one, if not both, of the competitors.  Likely moves if China pursued this option could be to offer to expand energy partnerships with Russia to solidify bilateral dependency.  China could also (simultaneously) expand trade with Turkey, especially in the sectors of technology and construction, to balance its influence. Yet thus far, it is a conundrum China has steadfastly avoided. But it is increasingly likely Beijing's leadership will need to navigate these choices while managing this overt and growing competition.

This Eurasian, civilizational clash embodied in Turkish-Russian competition undermines China's multipolar vision of a non-U.S. dominated global order. But multipolarity is not fragmentation. A protracted Turkish-Russian rivalry, particularly if it draws-in NATO, threatens to destabilize non-Western alignments and complicate China’s ambitions for a cohesive Eurasia - a project from which it is the primary beneficiary.  Equally uncertain is the extent to which China's own very real (and considerable) claims of civilizational identity supplant the current primacy of its "economic diplomacy first" stance.  It is not inconceivable, then, that three irreconcilable visions of Eurasia could be at play in an extended Turkey-Russian rivalry.

The Calculus

At the heart of the Russia-Turkey dynamic lies a zero-sum power calculus:  Russia, embattled by Western sanctions related to Ukraine and seeking to consolidate a post-Soviet sphere of influence, cannot tolerate a peer competitor in its near abroad - especially one like Turkey which wields NATO ties, growing technological prowess, and civilizational legitimacy in the Turkic and Islamic worlds. Meanwhile, Turkey, energized by a return to strategic assertiveness, sees its geopolitical role not so much as a "bridge", but as a central node in a multipolar Eurasia which exercises influence from the Balkans through Central Asia in direct overlap with Moscow's historical buffer zones. This competition is not just ideological; it is increasingly structural.  Each state's bid for regional leadership directly undermines the other's capacity to shape Eurasia's future on its own terms.

And in light of the recent NATO summit and the organization's renewed investment in defense, any encounter between the two countries only amplifies the rivalry.  So, what was once a manageable regional competition is now backed by structural alliances and strategic hardening that raises the stakes across Eurasia.

Conclusion

Given the recent regional developments and the continued pursuit of each state's national interests, it is realistic to anticipate that Russian-Turkish relations will become increasingly strained over the next five years.  Each country's civilizational claims continue to be drivers of geopolitical choice.  Competition in the Caucuses, Central Asia, and in the Black Sea will likely intensify, thereby making the success of any third-party efforts to facilitate cooperation increasingly unlikely.  As a result, this will increase economic risk to investors with regional exposure and also magnify security instability in the region for the foreseeable future.  In the struggle for Eurasia, Moscow's greatest threat may not be NATO, the U.S., or even China -- but Ankara, whose aspirations are increasingly regional, equally civilizational, and decidedly independent.