Trump’s Transactional Foreign Policy and its Implications on European Strategic Autonomy

The American National Style in 2025: How can Europe respond?

Tariffs, shattered alliances, and one crisis ‘solved’ each month: Donald Trump’s second term is American foreign policy in its rawest form. To help us understand this moment in history, few can help us as much as Stanley Hoffmann, who theorized that American foreign policy is guided by a clear National Style. President Trump’s second term magnifies enduring features of the National Style but has thus far applied them in ways that undermine long-lasting alliances, providing Europe with both challenges and opportunities. As the world finds itself in an era defined by geopolitical tensions, shifting power dynamics and a potential threat to US hegemony, it is key to understand how these deeply-rooted ideals shape US foreign policy.  Against this backdrop, this analysis seeks to examine some key points of the National Style, determine its relevance in 2025 and argue for Europe to adapt to the rapidly changing global order.

A Brief Historical Overview: From isolationism to interventionism

“But Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from their experience are of universal application, and they are reluctant to recognize that they are tied to the special conditions that made the American success possible.” (Hoffmann, 1968, p. 363)

The United States’ rather unique path to independence helps us understand its early foreign policy approach. Hoffmann argues that given Uncle Sam’s rather acrimonious 18^th century separation from the United Kingdom, its founding fathers chose to rather deliberately “avoid entangling alliances” (Hoffmann, 2002, p. 2). This strategy, while isolationist, did not mean the United States avoided conflict altogether. The 1823 Monroe doctrine, for instance, warned European powers against further colonization in the Western Hemisphere. Over time, this dogma entrenched American exceptionalism, turning isolationism into hawkishness. Ignoring the unique conditions that allowed for the US’ success story to unfold, the country sought to consolidate its influence on the American continent. This political ideology, Manifest Destiny, contends that the United States had a quasi-biblical destiny which justified its Westwards expansion.

In the 20^th century the United States shifted decisively from isolationism to internationalism, with the firm belief that democratic values were a commodity to be exported. This happened after World War II: until then, the US government had preferred to focus on domestic affairs, remaining faithful to its rejection of foreign entanglements. This was exemplified by the failure of Congress to ratify Washington’s entry into the League of Nations, even after heavy US involvement in World War I. At the end of World War II, the prevalent sentiment was that nations that depended on each other economically would not go to war. At the same time, for the first time in its history, the US had to contend with a rival superpower with an opposed ideology, the Soviet Union. This kickstarted the age of US interventionism, promoting democratic values as a way to extend its influence and contain communism.

Making America Great Again

Hoffmann argued that America views its experience as universally valid. Trump’s rejection of exporting democracy abroad does not contradict this dynamic; in fact, it reinterprets it. His “America First” doctrine suggests that the US alone should decide how its power and influence are applied, rather than being constrained by its alliances.

This was made clear by the President’s attitude towards military spending. Hoffmann contends that the US has a chiefly instrumental view of alliances, only valuable when they help advance American interests. Accordingly, President Trump suggested that America would not defend NATO allies that did not commit to meeting the spending floor of 5 percent of GDP by 2035. This is especially relevant against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which threatens the nearby Baltic states and Finland, all of which have had a troubled history with Moscow. A lack of concrete security guarantees may embolden Putin to continue expanding Russia’s sphere of influence further West, with the leader making a withdrawal of NATO troops in the region a precondition for a peace deal in Ukraine. In June, President Trump heralded NATO member states’ commitment to the 5 percent target as a major victory for his administration, stating that it relieved the US from the burden of defending its allies.

Not all NATO members agreed with the spending targets, with Spain particularly critical. In response, President Trump threatened Madrid with another of his favourite things—tariffs. Trump views tariffs as a way to make up for the US being treated unfairly by other states with whom they consistently run significant trade deficits. This zero-sum view of trade has become a signature element of Trump’s foreign policy in his second term, culminating with the “Liberation Day” tariff announcement in April for most states. Around the same time of the NATO spending pledge, the United States and EU reached a trade deal that placed a 15 percent ceiling on most goods - a deal that many say disproportionately favours Washington.

Overall, the perception in Europe is that under President Trump, the United States is not the ally it once was. The first eight months of Trump’s second term have confirmed a trend that started in his first - that the United States is abdicating from its leadership role in the international order it pushed to create. President Trump’s preference for an expedient end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine without robust security guarantees, for instance, runs counter to the rhetoric of most European leaders as it prioritises speed over sustainability. For neighbouring states, the discussions surrounding territorial concessions are alarming given that they could be next - especially if Putin is given the chance to rearm during a ceasefire.

A New Hope: Europe’s Response

“The European response to crisis and challenge has been endlessly varied - Europeans are used to ups and downs, twists and turns, good and bad breaks. Consequently, they are skeptical about the possibility of success in applying recipes, abroad or even at home, that worked once in a particular circumstance” (Hoffmann, 1968, p. 363)

Despite this shift taking place rather suddenly, Europe can still take steps to increase its strategic autonomy. In a global order where the United States is no longer willing to lead, there is a possibility for the bloc to harmonize its military strategy, invest in technology and achieve a higher level of political consensus.

A Unified Defensive Strategy

Reducing reliance on US defence systems is a prerequisite for true European strategic autonomy. While European militaries have significantly expanded in the eight decades since the creation of NATO, around half of their aircraft and anti-missile defence systems still come from the US, to give a few examples. An important step in the pursuit of strategic autonomy is the ability to produce most military components in-house. Spain’s recent decision to cancel a large order of American F-35s, committing to buy European instead, shows a willingness to support European manufacturers. Similarly, European defence stocks have rallied since the results of the 2024 US Presidential Election, showing that the markets expect these companies to play a larger role going forward.

Current efforts to spearhead European military capabilities include the Permanent Structured Coordination (PESCO) treaty and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Both initiatives have successfully increased collaboration between EU member states, supported innovation and boosted interoperability of European armed forces. While a step in the right direction to reduce the bloc’s dependence on the US, the initiatives fail to address the root cause of this lack of military autonomy, which is that EU member states are unwilling to relinquish the required sovereignty to a body led by a foreign national. This is especially true in the current environment of increased far-right nationalism and Euroscepticism. PESCO signatory member states still maintain the capabilities that are developed and can chose whether to contribute to missions, which can be an issue when there is no political consensus on a specific crisis. Another issue is the fragmented military production, which results in inefficient spending and makes maintenance more difficult.

A solution for Europe to increase its military strategic autonomy would be to consolidate weapons manufacturing. In practice, this means standardizing the production of missiles, jets and vessels, among other systems. Different states could focus on producing weapons where they currently hold a competitive advantage, such as Germany with projectiles, France with jets or Italy with aircraft carriers. While certainly worth discussing, this strategy is currently unfeasible for two main reasons. First, member states that do not hold a competitive advantage, especially smaller ones, would likely oppose such measures as they would not want to lose a critical part of their economies. Second, these initiatives may be seen as uncompetitive as they disproportionately would favour larger defence contractors. This would reopen the debate caused by the September 2024 Draghi report, which pointed at defence as one of the critical industries lagging behind the United States.

The Battle of All the Chips

The pandemic period made the risks of modern supply chains abundantly clear, especially when it comes to the production of critical technology such as semiconductors. Decades of underspending have made Europe incredibly reliant on Asian countries for the fuel that powers technology for both civilian and military use. The EU Chips Act seeks to change this, with around €43 billion pledged in public and private investment to double the bloc’s market share by 2030, increase funding for R&D and develop the required skills to decrease their reliance on other continents. If done correctly, this would allow Europe to become a leader in the technology sector - an area where it has frequently lagged behind the United States in.

Moreover, developing technological resilience would strengthen Europe’s soft power. The United States, having built most of the current semiconductor infrastructure through strategic investments in allied countries, has often been punitive with its rivals, an example being the export controls with China. In other words, it uses coercive diplomacy to obtain concessions or weaken a rival power. As Hoffmann argues, this is because the US believes that its way of doing things is the right way. Europe, on the other hand, is the byproduct of centuries of conflict that have toppled empires and redefined borders. Thus, it has no such certainty it its way of doing things and no such desire for others to emulate it. A world where Europe is the main player could redefine the way technology is shared.

That being said, it would naïve to assume that Europe would make their chips available without restrictions - especially those with dual civilian and military applications. The current ban on Russia would certainly continue as Europe’s market share in the chip industry rises, with individual EU member states able to impose stricter controls if desired.  An example of this can be seen with the Netherlands’ alignment with US export controls following significant pressure from the White House. This is a symptom of a larger disease, as division within the institutions is rampant and stalls action on key issues.

To this end, the EU should establish a central funding mechanism, as the current structure relies too much on individual member state pledges. This would prevent individual member states from making funding contingent on furthering their national agenda. Furthermore, the EU Chips Act is far less protectionist than its US counterpart, meaning that it lacks the required strategic depth due to its focus on open competition. For Europe to become a dominant power in the race for this crucial technology, it will need to become more than a sum of its parts.

In sum, Stanley Hoffmann’s idea of a distinct National Style still applies to a Trump foreign policy. The American conviction of the universality of its experience, together with its instrumental view of alliances, is in line with its willingness to disregard the international consensus when convenient. Trump’s transactional approach reinterprets the National Style: alliances are only valuable when they serve US interests, trade is seen as zero-sum and foreign conflicts should be resolves quickly, even at the cost of stability in the long-term.

This presents the EU with both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is the inability to rely on the United States as a security guarantor, a role it has played since the end of World War II. The opportunity lies in building true strategic autonomy through further defensive cooperation, building on the PESCO and EDF frameworks and investing heavily in its semiconductor industry. Political will remains the missing ingredient - but if Brussels intends to fill the leadership void left by Washington, hesitation is no longer an option.