Venezuela’s Geopolitical Position in 2025: Between Crisis Management and Strategic Realignment

Venezuela’s Resource Wealth: From Potential to Decline

Venezuela possesses some of the most abundant resources in the Western Hemisphere with substantial gold, coltan, and lithium deposits and vast tracts of arable and biodiverse landmass, as well as the largest proven oil reserves in the world, representing a long-term strategic value.

However, an extended period of economic contraction, widespread corruption among prominent government officials, and alleged human rights violations have resulted in a systematic decline that has fuelled hyperinflation, poverty, infrastructure decay, high crime rates, and systematic emigration. In the last ten years, approximately 8 million Venezuelans have left their country in search of stability elsewhere.

Petroleum has always supported Venezuela’s economy, earning it the nickname “Saudi Venezuela”. By the end of the 1990s, 90% of export earnings came from oil, which also finances a large portion of public spending. But from more than 3 million barrels per day in 1998 to less than 800,000 in 2025, production has drastically decreased.

The crisis, which predates international sanctions, is the result of systematic underinvestment, corruption, and the degradation of vital infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools). U.S. sanctions, especially those imposed during the Trump Administration, slowed this trend by preventing Caracas from accessing financial markets and punishing companies that worked with the state oil company PDVSA.

Although these dynamics have complex internal causes, such as a highly centralised rentier model, they also mirror broader geopolitical features, including migration, energy, organized crime, and even terrorism, that have impacted the country’s ability to leverage its wealth sustainably.

Foreign Policy: From Regional Leadership to Strategic Realignment

Over the last 25 years, Venezuela’s foreign policy has changed significantly. Venezuela used to be a major oil supplier to the United States, an active member in OAS frameworks, and a close partner to the West. However, the nation has turned away from it under Hugo Chavez’s (1999-2013) and Nicolas Maduro’s (2013 – present) leadership, and embraced ties with non-Western powers, like China, Russia, Iran, and Türkiye.

These realignments have been motivated by a confluence of strategic isolation, pragmatic necessity, and socialist ideology. Since 2017, Washington has initiated a “maximum pressure” approach that included economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and even recognising the opposition leader Juan Guaidó as President rather than Maduro. In his second term, Trump escalated the sanctions and imposed tariffs on buyers of Venezuelan crude, intensified massive deportations of Venezuelan migrants to third countries like El Salvador, and Nigeria. But also, Trump agreed to keep oil licenses for American oil companies to secure its energy leadership in the region.

Despite sanctions and political hostility, Washington maintained a cautious energy engagement with Venezuela through firms like Chevron. In 2022, the Biden Administration granted Chevron a license to resume oil production in joint ventures with PDVSA under strict conditions. By 2024, Chevron had increased its operations in the Orinoco Belt, extracting nearly 100,00 barrels daily. But, when Trump returned to the White House, he paralized the license and after intense negotiations, the U.S. government reactivated it with the condition of not paying taxes and perks to Caracas

The Maduro regime has also leveraged mass migration as geopolitical pressure. By allowing economic collapse and then controlling border flows, Venezuela has created instability across the region. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and even the U.S. southern border have faced waves of desperate Venezuelan migrants.

This “migration diplomacy”, sometimes supported, sometimes restricted, has created bargaining leverage for Caracas. In return for limiting migrant outflows, Maduro has secured temporary relief from sanctions, normalization talks, and humanitarian aid.

The Role of Cuba: Intelligence and Internal Security

When Chavez became President in 1999, Venezuela initiated a closer partnership with Cuba, one of the remaining communist dictatorships following the end of the Cold War. Apart from political support, Venezuela sold a considerable amount of oil barrels to the island at low prices, even giving it for free, in exchange Havana significant support of the internal security and intelligence apparatus. Cuban advisors have helped develop frameworks for surveillance, data monitoring, and counterintelligence while working with organisations like the Venezuelan Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN).

Some political prisoners reported that Cuban intelligence officers have been accused of being directly involved in interrogations and torture practices against them. Several international organizations, like the UN Human Rights Council, are still investigating these claims.

Illicit Economies and the Rise of Criminal Networks

As the oil industry collapsed, informal and illicit economies became more prominent. Numerous investigations point to the Cartel de los Soles, a narcotrafficking network involving Venezuelan military personnel, as a major participant in the cocaine trade from Colombia to the Caribbean and West Africa. Some experts indicate that Nicolas Maduro and his Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello are the leaders of that cartel. According to DEA sources and independent watchdogs, approximately 350 metric tonnes of cocaine pass through Venezuelan soil every year, with a sizable amount travelling by air and sea to reach markets in Europe and the U.S.. The increasing reliance on the transatlantic drug trade on Venezuela as a platform is proven by the seizures in Guinea-Bissau, Spain, and the Netherlands, assessing the South American nation as a net exporter of substances.

Furthermore, with a crime index that can be comparable to war zones, Venezuela is among the most dangerous nations in the Americas. Even with the collaboration of the government, several gangs operate with absolute impunity, particularly in urban areas. The most prominent is the Tren de Aragua (TdA), which chose to extend its criminal network to third countries by taking advantage of the mass exodus of Venezuelans. Its presence has been concentrated in Colombia, Chile, Peru, and the United States, where some members have been arrested for a variety of offences such as murder, kidnapping, and extortion. Also, some experts assure that the TdAis used by Maduro as a tool to control any kind of dissidence overseas. One example took place in February 2024, when TdA members assassinated former Venezuelan army officer Roland Ojeda in Chile.

Consequently, Maduro, Cabello, along with high-ranking officers are wanted by the US authorities, with a reward of up to $50 million for the crime of narco-terrorism. Likewise,the Trump Administration designated both groups, the Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua, as foreign terrorist organisations, citing their involvement in transnational drug trafficking, human smuggling, and violent criminal activity, representing a national security threat. Thais acción has triggered a complete militarización of the Caribbean to neutralize these players.

The collapse of the formal economy and the weakening of institutional oversight have created a vacuum that criminal actors have filled. As state actors became complicit or passive in enforcement, criminal networks expanded their reach. The militarisation of these economies has also blurred the line between state and non-state actors, enriching a parallel governance system.

Colombian Guerrilla Groups and Cross-Border Integration

ELN (National Liberation Army) and FARC dissident elements are established in the Venezuelan border states of Zulia, Tachira, Apure, operating as local enforcers in remote regions, and oversee illegal economies along with the Cartel de los Soles. Chavez’s leadership is accountable for this sanctuary alliance. When the Colombia Army took back Raul Reyes’s computer after eliminating the FARC leader in 2008, it discovered that Caracas had been providing logistical and military support to guerrilla groups. 

With logistical networks and a territorial presence in both Venezuela and Colombia, the ELN and FARC dissidents have grown more into a binational armed actor. Widespread displacement and insecurity have followed from clashes between these guerrillas in Catacumbo and Apure. There have been reports of ELN leaders’ political support for Maduro and joint operations with the Venezuelan armed forces.

Recently, in July 2025, Colombia and Venezuela signed a deal to create a Binational Economic Zone across the border. Although both governments have hailed it as an opportunity, some experts assert it intensifies the risk of criminal governance and the legitimacy of authoritarian players.

China and the Belt and Road Initiative

Venezuela’s relationship with China has grown beyond energy exports since officially joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2018. Even though Beijing has reduced its loans, Chinese companies are actively involved in key sectors like mining, oil, construction, and telecommunications. For instance, firms like Huawei and ZTE were actively involved in ID and digital surveillance.

Nowadays, as the economic scenery worsens, the Maduro Administration repays all its debts with China by exporting minerals from the Orinoco Mining Arc, where social unrest, deforestation, and illicit mining (especially those controlled by the guerrilla) are becoming more common.

Although China has approached the recent instability in Venezuela cautiously, its engagement is motivated by resource access and geopolitical positioning, rather than an ideological approach.

Russian Presence and Wagner Group Activities

Like China, Russia partnered with Venezuela as a strategic partner in order to keep its presence in Latin America in opposition to Washington’s interests. Russian military advisors are in Caracas and have participated in training Venezuelan personnel, maintaining equipment, and conducting joint exercises. Additionally, senior figures like the former head of SEBIN, Christopher Figuera, assured the existence of Russian bases in the state of Aragua, next to Caracas.

Reports of Wagner Group members working in southern Venezuela, particularly near mining areas and vital infrastructure, have surfaced since 2022. Open-source intelligence and journalistic investigations indicate that Wagner has assisted in securing mining routes and trained local forces in logistical and security operations, including the Presidential Guard. In admitían, There are unconfirmed rumors about the dispatch of Oreshnik missiles on Venezuelan soil.

These engagements reflect Russia’s broader interest in retaining influence in Latin America and maintaining a foothold close to U.S. interests.

Iran’s Expanding Footprint

Since 2020, Iran has taken a more active role in Venezuela as both governments have worked to strengthen their strategic alliance and get around Western sanctions. Venezuela, which was isolated internationally and faced acute fuel shortages, accepted Iranian shipment of petrol, refinery parts and technical assistance in return for gold and access to mining and industrial projects. However, this alliance broadens on previous ties made under Chavez and Ahmadinejad, such as energy contracts and covert mining operations.

An illustration of the collaboration between the two governments can be seen at the Libertador Air Base in Caracas, where Tehran is instrumental in assisting Venezuela in establishing domestic drone production. The Ansu-100 and 200 UAVs are based on Iran’s Shahed technology, which Russia has been using in Ukraine. Furthermore, The Islamic Republic allegedly provided anti-ship missiles, fast-attack boats, and specialized training in public order and internal repression.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources claim that Venezuela has circumvented IAEA inspections and violated UN Security Council resolutions by supplying Iran with uranium that was taken from the Roraima basin. This claimed uranium-for-arms commerce is viewed as boosting the bilateral security partnership.

In parallel, long-standing accusations about the Venezuelan authorities issuing passports to people suspected of being related to Hezbollah have come back to the fore. According to investigators, more than 170 Iranians were arrested in Canada in 2014, holding Venezuelan identity documents. Furthermore, in places like Zulia and Margarita Island, Hezbollah-affiliated cells are also believed to operate through financial networks rather than direct militant activities.

Conclusion: A Complex and Contested Geopolitical Posture

While the world’s attention remains fixed on conflict in Ukraine and Gaza, Venezuela has subtly evolved into a geopolitical crossroad where rival global powers- Russia, China, Iran and the United States – compete for influence in Latin America. Its strategic significance in the Western Hemisphere has increased due to its abundant natural resources, as well as the ripple effects of mass migration and humanitarian collapse.

Maduro’s deepening reliance on anti-Western powers has constrained his diplomatic flexibility while simultaneously granting U.S. adversaries a foothold in Latin America. In this context, Venezuela is less a localized crisis and more a node in broader global rivalries.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has intensified pressure on Caracas, particularly in response to the entrenchment of criminal and terrorist networks from TdA to Hezbollah. As this pressure mounts, some form of tactical realignment with Washington may become unavoidable, whether through negotiation or coercion.

Thence, three scenarios are left. The first one is that Maduro continues his operations and close alliance with Moscow, Beijing and Tehran, but cautiously, considering the risk of defying Donald Trump. The second one is to continue a calculated approach to Washington, motivated by strategic exhaustion and economic despair. The third one is the collapse of his regime and the restoration of democracy.