Weaponized Migration: Russia’s Hybrid Tactic to Destabilize and Disrupt the EU & Schengen’s Eastern Border States

Part 2: A Country-Level Analysis: Impacts and Responses Along the Schengen-Eastern Frontier

As outlined in the first part of this analysis, weaponized migration presents a complex and evolving hybrid threat. The strategy has affected Europe as a whole, placing disproportionate pressure on the states directly bordering Russia and Belarus. This second part aims to conduct a country-level analysis to examine how each of these frontline states has been impacted. This will highlight both the severity of the consequences and the variations in national responses. By analyzing individual cases, this section seeks to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and to identify common patterns, policy gaps, and strategic needs. The goal is to group together an analysis of the various countries involved to understand how the EU could address the issue to respond more effectively and cohesively to this Eastern-front hybrid threat.

Poland

As already mentioned in the first analysis, Poland has been one of the most impacted states by the weaponized migration strategy launched by Belarus and supported by Russia. Since 2021, following EU sanctions on Lukashenko’s regime, Poland has faced repeated surges in irregular crossings. These have often been aided by Belarusian authorities using state-backed travel agencies to direct migrants to the border.

To address the issue, the Polish government passed a controversial law in 2025 to suspend asylum rights for new arrivals at designated border zones. Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated the necessity for such a response to counter the hybrid threat, citing 100-200 daily crossing attempts and accusing Belarus of actively supporting the flows. The law allows the suspension of asylum procedures for 60 days, renewable with parliamentary approval. In addition, it has received EU political backing under the justification of hybrid attack conditions.

However, human rights groups and the UNHCR have strongly criticized Poland’s approach. Reports document systemic abuse by Polish border forces, including beatings, pushbacks, and denial of medical aid, raising serious concerns over violations of EU and international law. The UNHCR warned that the new rules risk breaching the non-refoulement principle and lack proper legal safeguards for asylum seekers.

While the EU has provided financial support for Poland’s border defense, critics warn that the country’s approach sets a dangerous precedent by undermining asylum norms and weakening the EU’s humanitarian commitments.

Finland

Since late 2023, Finland has experienced a sharp rise in irregular migration from Russia, with over 1,300 third-country nationals, coming from the Middle-East and Africa, crossing without visas. The Finnish government has been attributing this to Russia’s use of weaponized migration, in retaliation for Finland's NATO membership in April 2023. Migrants were reported to arrive in freezing conditions, often lacking documentation and traveling by bicycle. This further supports the claims that Russian officials were actively assisting them.

In response, Finland took a series of restrictive measures:

• Closed all land border crossings with Russia until further notice;

• Banned maritime leisure boating at key ports: Haapasaari, Nuijamaa, and Santio;

• Centralized asylum applications to selected maritime and air border points as of 15 April 2024.

  
  

These actions are grounded in the Border Guard Act and are subject to ongoing governmental review. On the 16th of April 2025, the government reaffirmed the closures and centralized procedures.

To strengthen legal authority, Finland passed the Border Security Act which came into force in July 2024, which has been extended until December 2026. The Act enables the government to restrict asylum reception at specific borders during exceptional circumstances. Passed by a wide parliamentary margin (167–31), it reflects bipartisan concern over border security, though some lawmakers and observers raised human rights concerns.

This situation seen in Finland, highlights the broader strategy to exploit EU border vulnerabilities, inflame domestic tensions, and weaken democratic resilience.

Estonia

Estonia has emerged as a key frontline state in confronting Russia’s use of migration as a tool of hybrid warfare. Estonian officials have repeatedly accused Moscow of orchestrating migratory flows to destabilize Estonia and the EU as a whole.

In February 2024 it had already warned that it would close its border due to a surge in undocumented migrants from countries such as Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. The Estonian Police and Border Guard claimed Russia was deliberately directing these groups to the border, echoing similar tactics used against Finland.

Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur described the situation in November 2023 as a “fully state-orchestrated” effort by Russia, highlighting that such coordinated migrant arrivals through tightly controlled Russian territory were implausible as accidental.

Former Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, now Vice-President of the European Commission, warned in May 2024 that Russia is trying to destabilize Europe by making Ukraine unlivable, forcing mass migration westward. She tied this tactic to previous Russian activities in Syria and Africa and argued that it fuels far-right sentiment in Europe by exploiting human rights obligations. Former President Ilves predicted up to 30 million Ukrainians could flee if Ukraine falls.

Estonia is pushing for stronger EU defense integration and NATO coordination while advocating maritime security improvements in response to recent undersea infrastructure attacks. Although Estonia has no current plans to send troops, it supports keeping adversaries uncertain.

Latvia

Latvia has been actively responding to the weaponization of migration by Russia and Belarus, viewing it as a deliberate hybrid threat aimed at destabilizing its eastern border. Defense Minister Andris Sprūdr directly blamed Vladimir Putin, calling him the “puppet master”. Meanwhile, President Edgars Rinkēvičs underscored the urgent need for stricter migration controls at both the physical and legal levels. He urged the European Union to revise its existing migration and asylum regulations, emphasizing that securing borders requires not only improved infrastructure but also a tougher legal framework to curb irregular migration and tighten asylum rules.

Rinkēvičs noted an increasing consensus among EU member states on the necessity to update migration norms to address the challenges of the 21st century. Moreover, migration pressures are not confined to Latvia’s eastern border but are also a significant issue in southern Europe, suggesting that any EU reforms must consider the wider context.

Latvia’s Interior Minister Rihards Kozlovskis reinforced these concerns by warning of an escalation in hybrid warfare tactics, including sabotage attempts such as the arson attack on the Occupation Museum. Kozlovskis linked these hostile acts directly to Latvia’s consistent support for Ukraine, suggesting that Russia is retaliating through covert provocations.

In line with these concerns, Latvia tightened border controls in March 2025 by restricting pedestrian and cyclist crossings at three critical checkpoints, Paternieki (Belarus border), Terehova and Grebneva (Russian border), allowing only motor vehicles to pass. This measure was taken following a request from the State Border Guard, who reported groups gathering near these crossing points, raising risks of border breaches and public disorder.

The Latvian government framed the move as essential to enhancing national security and mitigating hybrid threats posed by Russia and Belarus. Latvia has also constructed a fence along its border with Belarus and plans to complete a similar barrier on its Russian border within the year. The government stresses the importance of coordinated EU efforts to address these migration and security challenges.

Lithuania

Lithuania views irregular migration from Belarus as a form of hybrid warfare, deliberately used to destabilize the EU in retaliation for sanctions. In response, it passed a controversial law in April 2023 legalizing migrant pushbacks, formalizing measures in place since 2021. Despite criticism from human rights groups, officials justified the move as necessary for national security, warning of future migrant flows enabled by Belarus through routes from Iran and Iraq.

To physically secure its border, Lithuania completed a 4-meter-high, 550 km razor-wire fence in 2022. In August 2023, it closed two border checkpoints with Belarus (Šumskas and Tverečius) due to security threats, including the presence of 4,000–4,500 Wagner Group mercenaries near its frontier. Officials also raised concerns that visa-free access to Belarus could be used for espionage or recruitment.

With migration pressures rising again in spring 2025, Lithuania deployed additional troops to the Varėna district to support border guards. Over 680 crossing attempts were repelled in early 2024 alone, compared to 1,002 in all of 2023. Lithuania is coordinating with Latvia and Poland, who face similar threats, to maintain a united regional response.

Norway

Regarding Norway, the northern country’s situation dates back to the migratory crisis of 2015–2016. In 2015, Norway experienced an unusual influx of around 5,500 asylum seekers crossing from Russia into its remote Arctic border region, many arriving on bicycles or wheelchairs due to legal restrictions on crossing by foot. These migrants, primarily from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries, sparked suspicion. Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) suspected Russia was using this migration as a hybrid tactic to strain Norway’s welfare system, disrupt society, and even gather intelligence. The migratory pressure also fueled political gains for Norway’s far-right Progress Party, complicating Norway’s reputation for tolerance and EU relations.

Building on this experience, Norway now faces renewed concerns about similar hybrid migration threats from Russia. In response, the government is considering constructing a 200 km border fence equipped with sensors and surveillance technology, following Finland’s example after it closed its border in late 2023 due to over 1,300 asylum seekers crossing from Russia. Norway is also planning to increase border staff and enhance monitoring, with the possibility of closing the border if security deteriorates. Alongside this, Norway has ended automatic asylum for Ukrainian refugees due to strains on public services, a policy criticized by NGOs for inadequate child protections.

These measures reflect Norway’s ongoing effort to address and adapt to weaponized migration tactics by Russia, linking the 2015 migration crisis to current border security challenges and policy changes.

Broader Trends and Legal Controversies

Therefore, the situation across the six countries highlights a broader Russian strategy aimed at destabilizing Europe. This analysis has reflected on the resulting destabilization, security challenges, and political tensions, further diving into the cases of each country underscoring the challenges discussed in the first part of this greater analysis of weaponized migration.

In response, these countries have adopted similar measures, strengthening border security by building fences, introducing new policies to permit pushbacks, and closing borders to enforce stricter entry restrictions from the east. However, these actions have sparked significant criticism, as many are considered highly controversial. They raise serious concerns about compliance with international humanitarian law and the rights of asylum seekers.

Human Rights Condemnation of Pushbacks and Detention Policies

Human rights groups have condemned the range of “instrumentalization” measures as flagrantly at odds with international and EU asylum protections. In Finland, Amnesty International has raised serious concerns about the new emergency law. The law allows authorities to block asylum applications at the Russian border. It permits the use of force to prevent entry and skips individual risk assessments. According to Amnesty, this undermines the principle of non-refoulement. The law also fails to provide a genuine appeals process or proper screening for vulnerable individuals. As a result, it effectively green-lights pushbacks and increases the risk of violence.

In the Baltic states and Poland, similar critiques abound. Latvia’s state of emergency has enabled violent pushbacks, including beatings, electroshock torture, secret forest detentions, and coerced “voluntary” returns, in direct violation of EU law and non-refoulement principles. Lithuania’s “temporary accommodation” centres have arbitrarily detained thousands in prison-like conditions, subjecting them to beatings, racial abuse, and grossly overcrowded, unsanitary facilities without fair asylum access. A two-tier system that starkly contrasts the welcome afforded to Ukrainians. In 2021, in Poland, nearly 2,000 Belarus-border asylum seekers have endured degrading strip-searches, forced sedations, and repeated violent returns, while volunteers face prosecution, illustrating the racism and legal hypocrisy of granting Ukrainians refuge but denying protection to others.

These practices collectively breach EU directives, the recently adopted Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation, and core non-refoulement obligations. Amnesty and other observers have therefore urged both national governments and the European Commission to repeal these measures, investigate abuses, and restore humane, rights-respecting asylum procedures. Yet while these calls underline the urgent need to uphold legal commitments, they also expose a deeper dilemma: how can Europe resist weaponized migration without resorting to exceptionalism that undermines its own foundations? If pushbacks and derogations cannot provide a sustainable answer, then action must be taken at both the national and the EU level to mobilize alternative instruments capable of reconciling security with legality.

Policy Options and Strategic Tools for the EU and Member States

The measures adopted so far by frontline states illustrate both the urgency of the challenge and the limits of unilateral action. Fences, pushbacks, and exceptional laws may provide temporary relief, but they do not address the deeper vulnerability exposed by weaponized migration: the gap between Europe’s security imperatives and its legal-humanitarian commitments. To avoid being locked in a cycle of emergency responses, the EU must mobilize tools that combine credibility, legality, and long-term resilience.

First, the EU should build on the precedent of the Temporary Protection Directive, activated for over 4 million Ukrainians in 2022. Incorporating clear activation criteria into the Pact on Migration and Asylum, such as arrival thresholds or evidence of state-sponsored coercion, would allow rapid, rules-based responses. The European Commission could oversee implementation, with resources such as the 2024 Border Management allocation redirected to support frontline states, ensuring access to residence, healthcare, and education while reducing destabilization.

Second, enforcement of international law against migration weaponization must be consistent. An EEAS-led task force, for instance, could document incidents that violate core norms, such as the UN Charter’s prohibition of coercion and international refugee protections, and pursue targeted sanctions. Europol operations in 2021 and 2024 dismantled Belarus-based networks that smuggled over 1,200 migrants, charging up to €13,000 per journey, and recruited via hundreds of social media accounts. These cases show that sustained, coordinated enforcement disrupts profit chains and weakens coercive leverage. EU sanctions, such as the June 2021 restrictions on Belarusian carriers remain effective when backed by systematic documentation and international partnerships, including with UNHCR.

Finally, proactive intelligence-sharing can blunt coercive strategies without securitizing migration. Europol’s 2021 referral action, which removed 455 online accounts advertising smuggling from Belarus, demonstrated how monitoring digital platforms can reduce departures. Expanding this into a dedicated Migration Intelligence Hub, distinct from Frontex risk analysis by focusing specifically on state-backed coercion, would pool Europol’s operational expertise with Member States’ border data. AI-driven analytics could flag suspicious flows, identify operatives linked to hostile actors (e.g., Wagner-affiliated facilitators), and enable targeted interventions while safeguarding asylum rights.

Conclusion

This second part of the analysis has offered a detailed look at how the states directly involved are confronting weaponized migration as a tool of hybrid warfare. While each country faces distinct geopolitical pressures, their responses reveal a converging pattern: heightened securitization, legal exceptionalism, and increasingly restrictive asylum practices. Though often justified as emergency measures to counter state-sponsored destabilization, these responses risk undermining core EU values, legal norms, and the integrity of the international asylum system.

More critically, these approaches form part of a broader “war on migration,” a self-reinforcing cycle that empowers authoritarian regimes, fuels border violence, and benefits entrenched political and economic interests, while failing to address the root causes of displacement. The EU’s reliance on third-country deals and externalized controls not only cedes leverage to coercive actors like Belarus, but also entrenches instability and corruption across border zones. This approach provides short-term deterrence optics at the cost of long-term strategic coherence.

The inconsistency of the EU’s response is particularly evident when comparing the treatment of Ukrainian refugees with that of other displaced groups. The Temporary Protection Directive was activated swiftly and effectively for Ukrainians, offering access to residence, healthcare, education, and employment with minimal bureaucracy. In contrast, similar arrivals at the Belarus border have faced pushbacks and legal derogations, despite also being the result of state-orchestrated pressure. Such double standards dehumanize migrants and undermine the EU’s credibility in defending international law.

Moreover, the normalization of emergency measures risks entrenching a permanent state of legal exception. Derogations from asylum standards are increasingly presented as pragmatic necessities rather than legal anomalies, raising fundamental questions about the drivers of EU lawmaking and the future of protection frameworks. Portraying migrants as “weapons” may serve political interests, but it diverts attention from structural drivers of migration and from the humanitarian responsibilities at stake.

To move forward, the EU must develop a coherent and principled migration diplomacy, one that avoids securitized narratives and instead employs civilian tools such as targeted sanctions, legal migration pathways, and coordinated solidarity mechanisms. Internal policies should align with strategic objectives rather than short-term political pressure, and cooperative partnerships must be built to reduce coercive leverage while safeguarding human rights and the rule of law.

If the EU is to resist hybrid threats without undermining its own foundations, it must reject reactionary, militarized approaches and return to a framework grounded in legality, accountability, and dignity. Only by doing so can it maintain both resilience and legitimacy in an era of geopolitical instability.