Controlling the New Arteries of Global Infrastructure: Undersea Cable Development and Competition Between China and the United States

Introduction: Why the United States Is Competing with China

Recent disruptions to critical undersea communication lines such as the 2025 cable cuts in the Red Sea, damage to Baltic Sea networks, and interference near Taiwan, have highlighted the fragility of the world’s data arteries. These incidents underscore how undersea fiber-optic cables, which transmit over 95 percent of global data traffic, are increasingly contested assets in a broader geopolitical struggle. Once viewed merely as infrastructure, these cables have become strategic instruments of economic leverage and national security. Their protection has emerged as a central concern for both governments and businesses who rely on uninterrupted global connectivity.

China’s accelerating undersea cable development through its Digital Silk Road, particularly via state-backed entities like Huawei Marine Networks (HMN Tech), has drawn scrutiny from the United States and its allies. The potential for espionage, data interception, and coercive control over global communications presents a strategic risk to open markets and democratic governance. Consequently, Washington has mobilized an integrated strategy that leverages all available tools to safeguard global digital infrastructure and ensure that critical communication networks remain resilient in the face of growing geopolitical competition.

Restricting China’s Expansion Through Legal, Economic, and Security Measures

The United States is pursuing a whole-of-government approach to restrict China’s participation in global undersea cable infrastructure. Multiple federal agencies including the DOJ, DHS, DoD, CFIUS, and FCC now coordinate oversight of foreign ownership and  development in U.S.-affiliated cable systems. In terms of recent legislative action, The Submarine and Cross-Border Telecommunications Cable Security Act (H.R. 3479), introduced in May 2025, is intended to enhance oversight through heightened cybersecurity planning and interagency cooperation. These measures aim to ensure that only trusted entities operate within U.S. digital infrastructure.

To offset China’s state-subsidized pricing and its aggressive global financing strategy, the United States has expanded the use of financial instruments through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Export–Import Bank of the United States (EXIM Bank), and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). These programs provide loans, guarantees, and feasibility studies to strengthen U.S.-aligned cable projects, supporting US-based vendors and reinforcing domestic capacity in manufacturing, shipbuilding, and maintenance. Diplomatically, the United States has also sought to align partners through initiatives like the Abuja Declaration (2025) and the U.S. Department of State’s Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables (2024), both of which emphasize adherence to the rule of law. By building consensus around these principles, Washington has mobilized a network of allies and partners committed to rejecting firms tied to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and advancing secure connectivity.

From a security perspective, the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have prioritized the protection of undersea cables as part of critical maritime infrastructure. Exercises such as La Pérouse 25 and NordIC WARDEN have enhanced coordination across allied naval forces, integrating unmanned underwater vehicles, seabed sensors, and satellite-linked surveillance systems. These operations safeguard maritime chokepoints such as the South China Sea and Arctic passages, a site of growing competition over resources and influence. They also demonstrate that cable security is an essential component of both deterrence and crisis response in modern hybrid warfare.

The “Trusted Cable” Regulatory Framework

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has established a regulatory process emphasizing transparency and accountability for all submarine cable projects connected to U.S. networks. Its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) outlines new requirements for ownership disclosure, periodic security reviews, and mandatory cybersecurity certification. Coordination among agencies such as DHS, DOJ, and the intelligence community ensures that potential risks are assessed continuously. This framework operationalizes the concept of “trusted cables,” embedding national security review mechanisms into the licensing process. It reflects a long-term strategy to integrate security oversight with commercial operations to prevent the infiltration of untrusted vendors or foreign influence.

Legislative and Policy Foundations

The Next-Generation Digital Security Architectures such as the Zero Trust Architecture developed by the DHS, envisions an integrated system for protecting both digital and physical infrastructure. Complementing this framework, H.R. 3479 establishes mandatory cybersecurity and ownership reporting for cable operators, creates an interagency oversight body for coordinated risk assessment, and directs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop technical standards for trusted vendors. The legislation also provides grant programs and federal support to ensure rapid cable repair and redundancy, strengthening the resilience of the entire communications ecosystem. Together, these policies serve as the foundation of U.S. digital infrastructure security and underscore Washington’s intent to maintain leadership in shaping international standards for secure data transmission.

Building a Coalition for Maritime Digital Security

Recognizing that undersea cable protection cannot be achieved unilaterally, the United States has expanded its coalition-building efforts. The Abuja Declaration established a platform for information sharing, route diversification, and capacity building among allied and partner nations. Similarly, the State Department’s 2024 Joint Statement on Cable Security reaffirmed a shared commitment to transparency, trusted vendor use, and resilience against sabotage. Countries involved include the G7 as well as members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”). Additionally, democratic allies such as South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, and European Union (EU) member states have signaled participation, along with strategic partners in the Global South including Nigeria, Kenya, Vietnam, and Brazil. Together, these nations are shaping a Maritime Digital Security Doctrine that aligns naval operations, commercial infrastructure, and data governance into a coherent defense of shared communication assets.

The “Clean Cables” Initiative: Promoting Trusted Connectivity

The Clean Cables Initiative represents the operational arm of U.S. digital diplomacy, promoting secure and transparent cable infrastructure through a combination of standards, financing, and outreach. The initiative encourages international partners to avoid reliance on PRC-affiliated firms and instead adopt open procurement processes emphasizing security and transparency. A notable example is the Vietnam–Singapore VTS (Vietnam–Telecom–Singapore) Cable, led by Viettel and Singtel, which reflects the principles of trusted collaboration by excluding unverified vendors and applying advanced encryption and redundancy measures. Financial mechanisms such as EXIM Bank guarantees and DFC investment loans incentivize compliance with trusted vendor criteria, while technology transfer partnerships promote innovation without compromising national security. Public awareness campaigns further highlight the strategic risks of PRC-linked systems, framing cable security as integral to economic growth and digital sovereignty.

Conclusion: Implications for Finance, Business, and Policy

For financial institutions, multinational corporations, and government agencies, undersea cable security is no longer a technical issue but a central component of geopolitical strategy. Market access and economic continuity depend on the stability and protection of this infrastructure. The United States’ approach anchored in legal reform, international coalition-building, and partnership with the private sector seeks to safeguard the global digital economy against coercive influence. For stakeholders across finance and business  understand this environment is vital to anticipating risk and seizing opportunities in the evolving architecture of global communication.

As the global digital landscape continues to evolve, Washington’s emphasis on secure undersea infrastructure reflects both defensive and strategic ambitions. The United States views these networks not only as conduits of economic growth but as instruments of national power projection and diplomatic engagement. Every policy tool—legal, economic, diplomatic, and military—serves to safeguard this architecture from coercive influence, ensuring the integrity of global data flows.

The broader context of this competition illustrates the convergence of technology and geopolitics. China’s Digital Silk Road has become a cornerstone of its global influence campaign, enabling Beijing to export digital norms and expand its control over critical infrastructure. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road’s digital component, Chinese state-backed companies offer comprehensive infrastructure packages that include cable construction, data centers development, and financial instruments intended to attract developing economies. The United States by contrast seeks to provide an viable alternative grounded in market-based principles and shared governance.

To counter this model, Washington has increasingly linked cable security to its Indo-Pacific and global economic strategies. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have begun integrating cable protection into hybrid warfare planning, acknowledging that disruptions to data networks could have cascading effects on global markets and military operations. This holistic approach bridges the divide between commercial infrastructure and national defense.

Private sector engagement remains essential. Technology companies like Google, Meta, and Amazon are leading new investments in transoceanic cable projects, bringing innovation and efficiency to the sector. Their collaboration with U.S. agencies ensures that strategic and commercial interests are aligned. Public-private partnerships facilitate information sharing, support advanced monitoring systems, and encourage rapid response to potential threats. As a result, the U.S. approach to undersea infrastructure security increasingly blends market dynamism with strategic oversight.

Furthermore, diplomatic engagement within multilateral forums such as the G7 Digital Ministers’ Meetings and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reinforces these efforts. By embedding cable security into global policy dialogues, the United States promotes uniform standards and curbs monopolistic practices. This diplomacy not only strengthens alliances but also encourages developing economies to embrace trusted vendors and transparent practices. For nations seeking to expand their digital infrastructure, adherence to trusted standards becomes a pathway to both economic resilience and international legitimacy.

The financial and investment implications of this competition are profound. Undersea cables represent long-term capital projects with high initial costs but significant strategic returns. As financial institutions assess the risks of geopolitical disruptions, secure infrastructure has become a key factor in investment decision-making. Banks, insurance companies, and multinational corporations are developing internal frameworks for evaluating the stability of digital infrastructure; recognizing that cable integrity directly affects data-driven industries and financial systems. The growing emphasis on environmental sustainability and resilience also intersects with security, as new cable projects integrate eco-friendly routing and maintenance practices that align with global environmental goals.

Looking forward, the success of the United States’ strategy will depend on sustained political will and continued cooperation among allies. Ensuring consistent funding for research, innovation, and repair capabilities will be vital. Equally important is the need to communicate the shared benefits of economic opportunity, technological innovation, and protection against data exploitation. In essence, the competition over undersea cables represents a contest over the rules of the digital order itself.

The strategic stakes of this competition extend well beyond technology. Control of the physical and digital arteries of global communication will shape the balance of power in the twenty-first century. By leading the development of secure, trusted, and transparent cable networks, the United States seeks not only to defend its interests but also to uphold a global system that favors openness, stability, and prosperity. This integrated effort, combining defense readiness, economic statecraft, and diplomatic engagement, underscores a central principle of modern strategy: that information infrastructure is inseparable from national security and global leadership.