The Alliance of the Sahel States: A Quest for Sovereignty
- Djamel Khaznadji

- 5 hours ago
- 5 min read
In 2023, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso agreed to form the Alliance of the Sahel States (AES). Originally a military alliance, the AES made plans for economic and political integration. However, serious challenges are hampering this project. All three countries face the same problems: an endangered sovereignty, economic stagnation, and socio-political uncertainty. In the face of these challenges, which the AES struggles to address, popular discontent has become louder. For the AES to succeed, a revolution on those three fronts – military, economic, political – needs to happen. While the task is not impossible, the path is fraught of hurdles.

The AES was formed to primarily reinforce the sovereignty of its member states and to fix their politico-economic problems. For years, there was a general frustration with the lack of security in the Sahel, despite Western interventions. This led to the rise of military generals, animated by the desire of sovereignty and liberation from Western influence. The creation of the AES was to oppose the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), deemed by the AES countries to be too subservient to Western interests. In this context, these generals have closed foreign military bases and sought relations with non-Western countries, namely China, Russia and Turkey. Sovereignty is the center piece of the AES project, but this sovereignty is under severe stress for all the members of this alliance.
All three members of the AES are faced with serious attacks to their territorial integrity. Having inherited colonial borders that had not taken into account the cultural and ethnic make-up of the region, the members states have struggled to protect not only their borders, but their authority within them. With only a limited budget, these governments decided to concentrate power in the capital and the major urban centres, leaving an abandoned and desperate rural population. This lack of control of the periphery has facilitated the movements of non-state actors, specifically armed groups. These groups brand themselves as the true defenders of the people. The lack of economic and professional opportunity in rural zones fuel recruitment into these armed groups. The case of Liptako-Gourma is telling and reflects the struggle of the AES to assert its power. Liptako-Gourma is a region shared by all three members of the AES, currently dominated by jihadist groups. None of Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso has managed to reclaim control of its chunk of Liptako-Gourma, with clashes having claimed thousands of lives and displaced millions of people. The military alliance that is the AES was designed to deal specifically with such problems.
Efforts to build this joint army have shown slow progress for a long time. It is only in December of 2025, after several attempts, that the AES Unified Forces was created. This force, comprised of 6000 soldiers, is funded by the tree countries of the alliance, though the specifics of each country’s contribution is not available yet. Military supply is provided by Russia, Turkey, Iran and China, thus preventing the Unified Forces from being too dependent on one foreign partner. This new force will operate across all three countries of the AES. Central command, based in Niamey, has exclusive authority over the joint force. The joint force is thus a fully confederal institution that does not need approval from national generals to operate. One of the main challenges will be to delineate the confederal force’s role and the those of the national armies, while at the same time aligning the objectives of both levels of military forces. Success will also depend on cooperation with neighboring countries, who are also plagued with insurgencies. Territorial integrity is the building block of the AES; a failure of its member states to address terrorism and military dissidence would be a major predicament. The establishment of the AES Unified Forces is an encouraging development, but it has much to prove.
The AES countries suffer from severe economic constraints. They are entirely dependent on commodity exports and have done little in terms of industrial development. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are rentier economies, meaning that they generate capital not through production but through revenues from ownership of certain assets and resources. Financial and technological dependence unfortunately remain. In such an economic model, production is limited and external shocks are always a threat. The high level of insecurity makes the governments borrow money for military purposes, money it could use to invest in strategic sectors. The high fertility rate in the Sahel results in a significant youth population. However, the lack of professional opportunities only leads them to join the armed groups operating in the region. A new investment strategy could focus on education and formal training to enter the job market.
The AES also suffers from being landlocked, but a potential Moroccan initiative could be of benefit. Morrocco, as part of its Atlantic Initiative, is currently planning on building a port in the city of Dakhla, which would grant Sahel countries much needed access to the sea, and thereby to new commercial routes. For Morrocco, this is an opportunity to become an important commercial hub and exert greater diplomatic influence in the Sahel. This project is still in its infancy, and faces some challenges, but nonetheless presents an interesting opportunity for the economic development of the currently isolated AES states. In such a precarious context, international partners, and particularly the Sahel’s immediate neighborhood, remain vital for the security, sovereignty and prosperity of the Sahel.
Serious governance issues remain an obstacle to the full integration of the AES countries. Ever since gaining their independence, the Sahel states have failed to move away from the system imposed by colonial forces. Instead, they doubled down with a highly centralized government – in which corruption is widespread – that marginalized the rural population. The state was thus perceived as distant, uninterested in the well-being of its people, and incapable of ensuring security over its territory. This, as stated above, opened the door to various armed groups – who claim to be the true provider of justice – to gain control and influence over territories neglected by the state. One solution would be to form a new social contract by rethinking governance. A government that will recognize the cultural and ethnic diversity of its territory, ensure justice for all its people and establish a decentralized form of democracy that will fully integrate local authorities to the machinery of the state and give a voice the populations that had been hitherto marginalized. Experimenting with decentralized democracy is especially relevant considering the AES’s long-term goal of political integration. If such an integration is to happen, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso will have no choice but to clearly delegate powers and establish clear spheres of exclusive competences – in other words, a federation. Having gone through that process of delegation at the national level would inform key delegatory decisions at the federal level. Unfortunately, such a vision is aggressively opposed by the current elite of the Sahel countries. Nonetheless, a healthy relationship between the state and its citizens is just as important to reach stability, if not more important, than military force. The Sahel governments will have, sooner or later, to contend with that reality.
The AES is an ambitious project aimed at reinforcing sovereignty and security and ensuring prosperity in one of the most dangerous parts of the world. Significant problems such as territorial fragmentation, economic stagnation and political fracturing pose a serious obstacle, however. Recent military initiatives show a serious desire to tackle insecurity and maintain sovereignty, but there is much to prove. Economic opportunities are on the horizon, and governance itself must be reinvented. Only a three-pronged revolution addressing these issues would help the AES in its integration project.





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