Europe: the Lost Art of Defence

Europe Wants Strategic Autonomy - But Cant't Rely on Itself

Since the end of the Cold War, European countries have relied on the US-led NATO alliance. However, Europe's long-standing reliance on minimal defence commitments appears to be ending. Trump’s second term has accelerated a process of the US pivot to Asia and the pullback from European defence. While the European borders are getting more and more exposed to geopolitical tension and conflicts, Europe’s influence over decisions in these conflict zones has waned. The discussion over defence and military readiness is focused largely on the EU’s defence budget size. Is this the correct approach? Are European countries ready for an arms race between major powers?

Global politics is reverting to a neorealist paradigm, where power politics and national interest dominate over multilateralism. This is evident considering the US, China, Russia, Israel, and Iran. In this context, Europeans need to give the right level of importance to the new technological push. AI-enabled warfare, space capabilities, drone swarms, and autonomous weapon systems will define the new primacy in world leadership. Recent demonstrations — such as US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s drone showcase at the Pentagon (Todd 2025), and China’s dramatic drone display — underscore this trend.

The European defence industry and its roots

The state of the industry in Europe is not comforting. The European defence sector has gone through a huge reorganization and resizing. The number of defence firms in Europe declined by between 29% and 80% from 1960 to 2022. Leading to larger corporations with no clear European procurement policy. If this was intended to build a stronger united European army, the obstacles have stalled the process. Many issues remain unsolved: fiscal fragmentation, free-riding on the frontline countries, ‘public good’ nature of European defence, industrial nationalism and special interests, and national traditions and standards. More than 30 years since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has not found a solution to a core element that is defence. The EU’s political and strategic void risks rendering it blind to the evolving requirements on the battlefields: a blend of legacy systems and emerging technologies. Here, Europe has a large gap to close before stepping in as an independent actor between major military powers.

To understand why this happened, it is necessary to outline the dynamics of the European defence strategy in the last decades. The major European countries (France, UK, Germany) moved in the direction of a military capable of crisis management and asymmetric warfare following the wave of terrorism (Meijer and Wyss 2019). Instead, smaller countries, particularly those exiting Soviet influence, saw Nato as the enabler of their future security and independence. Both the former and the latter, since Russia’s rebuilt military capability and the re-engaging confrontation between Nato and Russia have seen a speed-up in their national defence policies. Some Russian neighbours got closer to Nato’s umbrella, increasing the geopolitical tension between Russia and the US as nuclear powers. These countries started with the development of a territorial defence approach, which is still lacking in military personnel or conscripts. Meanwhile, major European powers remained slow to react until the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war.

This inverse development between industry, decision enforcement and procurement has highlighted the inefficiencies of European defence. The financial constraints are an additional problem for military readiness and self-sustainability. This must be a clear warning to the decision-makers to avoid the disorganized fueling of the military economy. The new defence policy has to kick off with a deep understanding of the objectives of the European defence.

Global strategy and the European competitiveness

A long-foreseen crisis has now broken out, and it is not a one-time White House President, but an accelerating long-term process within global neorealism. The US needs to maintain its primacy, and the closest rival is China. For the United States, defending the European project has become too costly given the high stakes involved. Europe must take responsibility for its defense. However, there are huge gaps, such as satellite intelligence, reconnaissance and targeting, heavy transport aircraft or air defence, and nuclear deterrence – where Europe depends heavily on the US. What will the US role in Europe’s defence be in the next ten years?

The outgoing week has been a small piece in the puzzle to agree on a common European nuclear cooperation between France and the UK. The meeting produced grand rhetoric, including phrases like “special responsibility” or “It’s time to articulate it”. On the political side, these changes can bring together France and the UK as new leaders in a neorealistic foreign policy and reduce the role of the German chancellor. What would be the reaction of the European non-nuclear leaders? Surely this will not improve a Union that cannot agree on common policies. How do we build Europe and Europeans who are involved and enabled to define a common strategy? An expanding European nuclear deterrent is likely to further heighten regional tensions and may fuel a new nuclear arms race.

While the European policymaking has not agreed on a strategic plan for a European defence, the member states during the Nato summit in The Hague have raised the spending to 3.5% of their national  GDPs and committed to a 5% target for 2035 (NATO 2025). The question is not just how much Europe spends on defence – but whether it knows what it is defending, and why.

Investment pattern in the EU defence

Without hesitation, Europe’s rearmament effort is clearly underway. A simple strategy is set – huge funding has been moved into the defence sector. Given the Bruegel Institute’s proximity to Brussels institutions, it is possible to imagine that future European decision-makers will be choosing between an expanding existing cooperation structured within the European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), or a reframed one with the involvement of a new intergovernmental institution, such as the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), with more power over state sovereignty.

The European Defence is already benefiting from an increasing number of funding mechanisms and policies that started in 2017 and stopped until the Russian war in Ukraine.

v  Supply-side policies:

§  2017 EU-level defence policy

§  2021-2027 a European defence fund

§  2023 act in support of ammunition production

§  2024 European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)

§  2025 European Investment Bank changes its eligibility rules for defence.

v  Procurement:

§  2023 European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA)

§  2024 EDIP

§  2025 (SAFE) the security action for Europe through the reinforcement of European defence industry instrument.

v  Loosening fiscal constrains:

§  2025 SAFE instrument

§  2025 Rearm Europe

In conclusion, Europe must enhance its defence capabilities to strengthen its international standing. Achieving this will require a major interstate agreement. A stronger military posture would provide the EU with greater international relevance and to counterbalance external pressure. However, as long as the Union remains strategically fragmented by national interests, it will face significant challenges in establishing an effective mechanism to address the evolving realities of international affairs. This would allow to develop a common strategy that will determine the defence sector’s posture, determine financial needs and avoid inefficiency. Particular attention must be given to the emerging technologies that are transforming warfare on the battlefield, and nuclear deterrence. As a result, Europe will be better equipped to meet emerging challenges or deter potential conflicts in its neighborhood.