Has Russia failed in protecting Sahel juntas from terrorism?

Following military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2020 and 2023, most analysts agreed that a new era had begun for the Sahel, one in which cooperation with Russia would be a fundamental pillar. Russia offered the newly installed juntas’ military support through the Wagner Group, a formally independent mercenary group, while positioning itself as an economic and diplomatic partner for the region, drawing on its claimed “historical aversion to Western colonialism”. In an extremely unstable context, the appeal of novelty and distance from the former colonial power, France, helped shift public support toward Russia, as illustrated by images and videos of protesters raising Russian flags and welcoming Russian troops.

A few years later, however, the picture looks different. One of the basic premises that generated support for the Sahelian military juntas, and a reason to turn to Russia, was their promise to ruthlessly combat and end terrorism in the region. French-led and United Nations missions, which had previously supported civilian governments in counterterrorism efforts, avoided the worst-case scenarios but failed to eradicate the threat. Today, the Sahel has become the “global epicenter of terrorism”. In 2024, 54 percent of terrorism related deaths worldwide occurred there, amounting to more than ten thousand victims per year over the last three years, a figure that is likely underestimated due to restrictions imposed on independent media.

Last fall, events in Bamako, the capital of Mali, deepened existing concerns. A fuel blockade brought the city to a standstill, paralysing essential services, forcing schools to close, and leaving large parts of the population without electricity. Although the government has since restored order and deployed the army to secure key routes, the crisis exposed the shortcomings of the current counterterrorism strategy and further undermined confidence in Russia’s credibility as a security provider in the region.

Who are the terrorists?

Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Support Group for Islam and Muslims, is the main terrorist organisation active in the region and is responsible for 83 % of terrorism deaths there. JNIM, founded in 2017, is an alliance of various cells linked to al-Qaeda. The group is especially active in Mali and Burkina Faso, where it de facto controls a large share of territory, though it is also present in Niger and aims to expand toward the northern Gulf of Guinea states to gain access to the sea. In Niger, the main actor is the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Originally associated with the al-Qaeda-aligned group al Murabitun, it broke away in 2015 to pledge allegiance to ISIS, which recognised it as its own branch in 2022. The two groups are not aligned, and analysts foresee possible conflicts emerging. For now, however, JNIM remains the much bigger player in terms of manpower and warfare capabilities.

These groups primarily engage in armed confrontation with national militaries, as their ultimate goal is to overthrow existing governments and impose strict interpretations of Sharia law. They have also carried out numerous attacks against civilian populations. They finance their activities through kidnapping for ransom and extortion, especially targeting nomadic shepherds. Civilians in remote areas feel abandoned by their governments and sometimes turn to these groups, which in practice hold the monopoly of violence in these regions. In Burkina Faso, for instance, estimates suggest that between 60 and 70 % of the territory is not controlled by the government, giving terrorist groups significant room for manoeuvre.

Bamako under pressure

Despite gaining public support by promising to end terrorism through a tougher stance, the juntas have yet to deliver tangible results. Their strategy was to cooperate militarily with Russia, as collaboration with Moscow would have led to harsher methods, and less oversight by international organizations. 

The most telling case is Mali, which has witnessed the most important Russian involvement in the region (in terms of troops, Mali hosts 1000+ troops, compared to a few hundreds in the two other countries), and, together with the Central African Republic, has been the biggest success story about Russian involvement. Russian mercenaries were initially welcomed as heroes, a moment that represented a major setback for their Western rivals, especially France. After years of military engagement through Operations Serval and Barkhane, France left the country widely resented by the local population despite its significant investment of troops and resources in the fight against terrorism. Initially, the Russians obtained some symbolic victories, such as the reconquest of the city of Kidal in 2023. But since then, little success has been achieved.

The terrorists have since then secured a series of tactical gains, conducting coordinated attacks on strategic locations and steadily expanding the geographical scope of their operations. For the last couple of months, the capital of the country, Bamako, has been under a fuel blockade that has basically restricted all access to oil to the capital. The new strategy of JNIM has led to panic, as well as the closure of basic services such as schools and public transports. Gas prices have skyrocketed, and the capital has been almost constantly without energy. By mid-November, the situation had improved as the junta struck a deal with JNIM and increased military protection of the core routes. But while Bamako is the most reported case, similar blockades have happened in other smaller cities in all Sahelian states. 

The failure of the security side of the Russian activity in the Sahel is evident in the numbers. According to the Africa Center, Burkina Faso and Mali have witnessed 1,292 predatory attacks by Wagner forces and national armies over the past four years, causing 6,058 deaths. This exceeds the 5,708 civilians killed by Islamic militant groups in the same countries and during the same period. These operations have involved practices such as illegal detention and systematic torture of civilians, often carried out in former UN bases. Such abuses stem from a tendency among security forces to view communities living in jihadist‑influenced areas as collaborators, leading to the use of brutal tactics, including the burning of villages, to assert control.

Russian involvement in the Sahel

The reasons for Russia’s initial involvement are several. Russian mercenaries have been active in regions where they could trade their services for valuable resources, most importantly gold. In Mali and Burkina Faso, this is evident, as the areas where they were most active correspond to those with the highest concentration of gold. Similarly, in Niger, Russian activity is closely linked to uranium production.

At the same time, these operations served to expand Russia’s political influence and promote anti-Western narratives. It is important for the Kremlin not to remain isolated globally, and these developments highlighted the decreasing power and willingness to act of Western states. These operations also allow Russia to secure a foothold on the southern border of NATO.

This strategy has certainly brought Russia some gains. Russia has gained access to the natural resources these countries offer, especially gold, uranium, and rare earths. The economic and diplomatic isolation of these states makes them strongly dependent on Russia. It has also opened doors for economic cooperation. Russia has become the main supplier of weapons to Africa in the period 2018 to 2022, accounting for 40 % of total imports, more than China, the US, and France combined. Mali in particular recorded one of the largest increases, with a rise of 210 percent between 2013 to 2017 and 2018 to 2022. 

Another success for Russia has been the limited reaction and condemnation from African states to the war of aggression in Ukraine. In February 2022, when the UN General Assembly convened to deplore Moscow’s aggression and demand its withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, only Eritrea voted with Russia. In 2025, eight countries, including the Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES) - the group formed by the three military juntas in 2023 - voted against the resolution critical of Russia, only eight others voted in favour, and the vast majority abstained. This clearly shows how Russia is gaining diplomatic support by pulling African states outside of the West's sphere of influence. Finally, Russia’s presence contributed to the complete withdrawal of France and the United States from these countries.

Why is it failing?

However, given the numbers and the expansion of terrorist groups’ operations, it is difficult to argue that the mission has been a success, and even Russian officials are now shifting their narrative. The Russian representative to the United Nations, Dmitry Chumakov, recently asked for support from the international community for Sahelian states, in stark contradiction with the usual Kremlin approach, which for years preached against foreign interference in African affairs, especially from Western countries.

There are several reasons that explain why this military cooperation is not succeeding. The Sahel is a complex region on multiple levels, starting with geography. Mali offers a clear example. Interested in the gold-abundant northern regions, Russian troops were pulled into battles in the desert, which proved extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the battle for Tinzouatene in 2024, the group’s biggest defeat since Syria. At the same time, terrorist groups began shifting their focus toward the capital Bamako and other regions in the south and west, finding their rivals unprepared.

After the loss of Kidal, the terrorists understood that a hide-and-bite approach, melting into the desert and carrying out sporadic and targeted attacks, was more suited to their capabilities than attempting to hold territory. This strategy is far more difficult for Malian and Russian forces to counter.

Furthermore, a violent approach is not effective in a region marked by deep ethnic divides. The brutality of the Malian army has revived cooperation between separatist ethnic minorities and terrorist groups, which inevitably complicates the situation for Bamako, as regular armies are forced to fight larger numbers of adversaries in diverse and hostile environments. JNIM has tried to present itself in its videos as inclusive, avoiding sectarian distinctions and uniting people under the narrative of resisting the capitals. There is a clear correlation between the sharp rise in violence since the arrival of the Wagner Group and its harsh methods, which have created fear and a need for protection among local populations, pushing some to turn to terrorist groups.

Moreover, since February 2022 and the invasion of Ukraine, Russian priorities have shifted, and several Wagner brigades were redeployed. The events of 23 June 2023 marked a turning point. After months of expressing dissatisfaction with how the Ministry of Defense was conducting the war in Ukraine, Prigozhin, the head of Wagner, rebelled and marched toward Moscow. Although the march was halted through an agreement between the leadership, the rebellion effectively ended the group’s partial independence. Wagner was subsequently absorbed by the Kremlin and transformed into the Africa Corps. Although the group retained between 70 and 80 % of its personnel, it has become far more dependent on the Kremlin from a strategic point of view and has lost the flexibility and autonomy that characterized Wagner under Prigozhin, making it significantly less effective.

Conclusion

Events have shown that Russian involvement in the Sahel was never rooted in a deep belief in cooperation, but rather in a combination of economic interests and the pursuit of global influence, projecting strength and securing access to valuable resources. Although not all responsibility lies with its strategies, what is clear is that terrorist groups are expanding, and violence has increased significantly. Many individuals have lost their lives due to the harsh methods employed by Russian troops and by local militaries that feel less constrained without international observers. Since violence tends to perpetuate itself, it is easy to understand why these organisations continue to gain strength.

Russia has failed to protect the Sahelian population. Yet for now, it has helped sustain the juntas. It is uncertain how long this will continue, as Russia’s military power no longer appears as it once did, and the juntas, having failed to deliver on their basic promises, seem more fragile than ever. This is particularly evident in Mali, where the blockade of Bamako revealed a government unable to provide the most essential public services. In a broader context, this autumn has already seen two military coups in West Africa, one successful in Guinea-Bissau and one failed in Benin. Media reports indicate rising dissatisfaction among the public and within the armed forces, as relations with Russian military personnel deteriorate. Precedents in Mozambique have shown that mercenaries have no hesitation in abandoning missions when conditions become too difficult. The future appears increasingly uncertain for the military authorities in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.