Hezbollah: A Socio‑Geoeconomic Anatomy of Power in Contemporary Lebanon

Introduction

Hezbollah occupies a unique position in contemporary Lebanon. It is simultaneously a political party, an armed movement, a welfare provider, and a regional actor embedded within the strategic architecture of the Middle East. Much commentary reduces Lebanon to a collapsed state and Hezbollah to a destabilising militia. Such narratives obscure the structural dynamics that have shaped the organisation’s evolution and the social relations that sustain its legitimacy. Hezbollah’s power is not simply the product of coercion or external sponsorship. It is rooted in a complex interplay of historical contingencies, sectarian politics, regional rivalries, and economic networks that extend far beyond Lebanon’s borders.

This article examines Hezbollah as a socio‑geoeconomic actor. It traces its historical emergence, analyses its political and military roles, explores its welfare and social presence, and assesses the economic circuits that underpin its influence. It then considers how recent regional developments, particularly the post‑2023 escalation with Israel, are reshaping Hezbollah’s strategic trajectory. The aim is to provide an anatomy of power that moves beyond simplistic binaries and situates Hezbollah within the broader political economy of Lebanon and the region. 

Historical Context: Emergence and Consolidation

Hezbollah emerged in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The invasion, triggered by an attack attributed to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), created a profound power vacuum in the south. Lebanese state institutions were weak, fragmented, or absent, and various militias filled the void. Among them were Shia clerics and activists influenced by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, who sought to build a disciplined resistance movement. Iran dispatched members of its Revolutionary Guard to Lebanon to train and organise these groups, laying the foundations for Hezbollah.

In 1985, Hezbollah issued its Open Letter, articulating a programme centred on resistance to Israel, Islamic governance, and opposition to Western influence. Although the movement’s ideological language has since moderated, the themes of resistance and anti‑imperialism remain central to its identity.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah fought the Israeli Defence Forces and the South Lebanon Army in the occupied south. Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 was widely interpreted within Lebanon as a victory for Hezbollah. This moment became a cornerstone of its legitimacy, reinforcing its claim to be the only Lebanese force capable of deterring Israeli aggression. It also shaped the outcome of the Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war in 1989. While other militias were disarmed, Hezbollah was permitted to retain its weapons as a resistance force against foreign aggression. This exemption institutionalised its dual status as both a political actor and an armed organisation.

By the early 2000s, Hezbollah had become a major political presence. It entered parliament, built a media empire, and expanded its welfare institutions. Its political bloc, the Loyalty to the Resistance, remains a significant force in Lebanese politics. The movement’s 2009 manifesto signalled a shift towards a more inclusive national discourse, emphasising opposition to sectarianism and support for a unity government. Although its core constituency remains Shia, Hezbollah has sought to cultivate cross‑sectarian alliances, including through the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, which recruit from multiple communities.

Hezbollah as a Military and Regional Actor, 2019-2023

Between 2019 and 2023, Hezbollah’s military and regional profile expanded significantly. The organisation claimed in 2021 that it had a large number of trained fighters, reflecting its transformation from a guerrilla force into a hybrid military actor. Its involvement in the Syrian civil war was decisive for the Assad regime. Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters, gained battlefield experience, and integrated new technologies and tactics into its arsenal. This period also deepened its strategic alignment with Iran and embedded it within a regional network of allied groups stretching from Iraq to Yemen.

Hezbollah’s military capabilities during this period included precision‑guided munitions, drones, and fortified defensive infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Its regional engagements extended beyond Syria, including advisory roles and logistical support to allied movements. These activities reinforced its image among supporters as a defender of Lebanon and the wider region, while critics viewed them as evidence of Hezbollah’s subordination to Iranian strategic interests.

Domestically, the period coincided with Lebanon’s economic collapse. Hezbollah’s welfare institutions, including clinics, schools, and social assistance networks, became increasingly important for its constituency. These services, funded through a combination of Iranian support, local donations, and economic activities, helped sustain its legitimacy during a time of widespread hardship.

Post-2023: Escalation, Losses, and Strategic Recalibration

The events of October 2023 and the subsequent war in Gaza triggered a new phase in Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah opened a northern front, engaging in sustained exchanges of fire. The conflict escalated into a large‑scale Israeli operation in Lebanon in 2024, marking the most significant confrontation since 2006. The fighting resulted in substantial losses for Hezbollah, including personnel, infrastructure, and strategic assets.

A ceasefire agreement reached in late 2024 required Hezbollah to withdraw its forces north of the Litani River and mandated the deployment of Lebanese Army units in the south. The agreement also included provisions for the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Lebanese officials later claimed that the first phase of disarmament was underway, while Hezbollah’s leadership insisted that its core capabilities remained intact. The organisation’s new secretary general warned that any attempt by the Lebanese Army to forcibly disarm it would risk civil conflict.

The ambiguity surrounding Hezbollah’s current military posture reflects deeper structural realities. Disarmament is unlikely for two reasons. First, Hezbollah’s weapons are central to its identity as a resistance movement. They are not merely tools of coercion but symbols of its claim to defend Lebanon against Israel. Disarmament would undermine the organisation’s legitimacy and weaken its political position. Second, Hezbollah’s military capabilities are embedded within Iran’s regional strategy. As long as Iran views Hezbollah as a critical deterrent against Israel, the flow of support is unlikely to cease.

The current situation creates a strategic deadlock. Israel benefits from a weakened Hezbollah and increased Lebanese internal tensions, while Hezbollah seeks to preserve its deterrent capacity without triggering a full‑scale war. The Lebanese state, caught between these forces, faces the risk of renewed sectarian polarisation.

Hezbollah’s Socio‑Economic and Geoeconomic Networks 

Hezbollah’s power cannot be understood solely through its military or political roles. Its socio‑economic networks are equally important. The organisation operates a vast welfare system that includes hospitals, schools, reconstruction programmes, and social assistance. These services provide essential support to communities neglected by the state and reinforce Hezbollah’s image as a provider of stability and dignity.

Economically, Hezbollah is embedded in both formal and informal circuits. It participates in local trade, construction, and service sectors, while also engaging in cross‑border economic activities through networks in Syria, Iraq, and beyond. Informal financial flows, including remittances and cash‑based transactions, play a significant role in sustaining the organisation. Hezbollah has also been linked to global economic circuits, including diaspora networks in Africa and Latin America. These networks facilitate fundraising, logistics, and political influence.

Sanctions have targeted many of these activities, but their impact has been uneven. While sanctions have constrained Hezbollah’s access to formal financial systems, they have also pushed the organisation further into informal and decentralised economic channels. This adaptability is a key feature of Hezbollah’s resilience.

Regional Dynamics and Future Trajectories 

Hezbollah’s future trajectories will be shaped by regional developments. The post‑2023 environment has intensified the confrontation between Iran and Israel, with Lebanon serving as a key arena. If the Lebanese government were to pursue disarmament aggressively, the risk of internal conflict would rise further. Lebanon’s sectarian divisions remain deep, and political alliances often align with external patrons. Christian parties with historical ties to Israel may support disarmament, while Shia constituencies view Hezbollah as essential for national defence. The embeddedness of Lebanon in regional processes is far from one‑directional. What happens next for Hezbollah and Lebanon will also shape regional dynamics beyond the country, particularly for Israel.

Israel’s official position is to push for a total disarmament of Hezbollah, overseen by the new Lebanese government. This process has already heightened tensions to their limits. If the unlikely scenario of successful disarmament were to occur, the security benefits for Israel and for regional opponents of Iran would be clear. In such a scenario, Hezbollah would likely recalibrate its strategy by reducing overt military activity while strengthening its political and social roles. This approach would preserve its influence while avoiding direct confrontation. However, given Hezbollah’s multidimensional embeddedness in Lebanese society and the existential role of its military wing, more destabilising scenarios are far more likely. A renewed civil conflict would weaken Lebanon further and divert Hezbollah’s attention inward, benefiting Israel by reducing Hezbollah’s capacity to operate as a regional actor. Israel has historically used destabilisation as a tool to manage its northern frontier, and a fragmented Lebanon would reduce the threat posed by a unified resistance movement.

Yet a hawkish approach to Hezbollah’s disarmament, whether pursued by the Lebanese government or encouraged by Israel, also carries significant risks. A confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state would stretch the organisation’s resources, but it would not necessarily erode its power. If open hostilities re‑emerge in Lebanon, local dependence on Hezbollah as a security and welfare provider is likely to deepen, particularly among Shia communities. This would marginalise alternative Shia leadership and prompt Iran to reinforce rather than reduce its support. From the perspective of both the Lebanese state and Israel, the status quo therefore requires a delicate balancing act: taking decisive action while avoiding the entrenchment of the very hybrid armed actor they seek to dismantle.

Conclusion 

Hezbollah’s power is multidimensional. It is rooted in historical struggles, social relations, and regional political economy. Its legitimacy derives not only from its military capabilities but also from its role as a welfare provider and political actor. The organisation’s future will be shaped by domestic pressures including Lebanon’s prolonged economic crisis, the erosion of state institutions, sectarian competition, and the growing assertiveness of political actors who oppose Hezbollah’s armed status; by regional rivalries involving Israel’s evolving military strategy, Iran’s regional network of allies, and the repositioning of Gulf states; and by international constraints ranging from sanctions and financial restrictions to the strategic interests of global powers seeking to influence Lebanon’s trajectory.

Understanding Hezbollah as a hybrid armed actor rather than reducing it to a militant organisation provides a foundation for more constructive policy making, since it captures the full spectrum of its political, social, and economic roles. This perspective enables more realistic engagement with the dynamics shaping contemporary Lebanon and opens potential pathways for policy approaches that can also be applied to other hybrid armed actors, including Hamas or the Houthis.