Quiet Frontliners: Kuwait and Jordan at the Edges of a Region in Turmoil

Mainstream analysis of the Middle East has a recurring pattern of orbiting strictly around states with outsized  military or economic power. The likes of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and more recently, the UAE and  Qatar. Meanwhile, the role of Kuwait and Jordan, two states that play crucial stabilising roles, rarely dominate international headlines, while they navigate a region rife with geopolitical fragmentation. Their quiet contributions are underscored by a soft-power edge, with their prioritisation of endurance over projection.  Situated at the edges of major conflict systems, these states have developed political, diplomatic and security strategies, underscoring how regional order often rests not only on power centres, but also on strategically  placed, steady states. The role of the two cannot be understated. This text analyses Kuwait and Jordan as the quiet frontiers of the Middle East. Firstly, by examining Kuwait’s diplomatic posture; domestic vulnerabilities, and role in global energy  geoeconomics, and secondly, Jordan's strategic geography; and security architecture in the face of demographic and  economic pressures.

Kuwait: Low-Profile Diplomacy and Structural Vulnerability in the Gulf 

Foreign policy and the logic of low-profile diplomacy

Kuwait’s foreign policy has long been characterised by cautious engagement, multilateralism, and conflict  mediation. Scholars widely describe it as a “soft balancing” or “hedging” state, using diplomacy, alliances, and humanitarian outreach to offset structural vulnerability stemming from its size  and geography. Notably, the 1990–91 Iraqi invasion cemented a national security culture built around avoiding provocation and embedding Kuwait within international institutions. Subsequently, Kuwait’s approach  remains distinct within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pursued  assertive regional strategies - including intervention in Yemen and active influence operations across the Arab world - Kuwait has maintained neutrality, as seen in its refusal to join the 2017–2021 blockade of Qatar. This mediating stance is partly a function of domestic political constraints: Kuwait’s elected parliament and relatively open public sphere generate a form of accountability not found elsewhere in the Gulf. Foreign policy decisions often require some degree of parliamentary support, incentivising consensus and discouraging adventurism. Kuwait’s diplomacy has thus become a tool for navigating the Gulf’s competitive landscape. It seeks cordial relations with Iran, even while hosting significant U.S. military forces; it maintains  GCC solidarity while avoiding alignment in intra-Gulf disputes; and it is a major donor to humanitarian and development initiatives, particularly in Syria and Yemen. In a region dominated by the rhetoric of power projection, Kuwait’s emphasis on discretion and dialogue constitutes a strategic posture designed for survival.

Internal political gridlock and structural uncertainties 

Despite its external steadiness, Kuwait faces mounting internal vulnerabilities. The recurring political  deadlock between the government and the National Assembly is one of the most chronic governance  challenges in the Gulf. Numerous cabinets have resigned or been reshuffled in response to parliamentary  pressure, while legislative–executive tension has stalled fiscal reforms, infrastructure development, and  diversification strategies. Moreover, succession politics add an additional layer of uncertainty. Compared with other Gulf monarchies, Kuwait’s leadership transitions are more open to intra-family negotiation, occasionally generating public speculation or factionalism. The 2020 succession and subsequent changes within the ruling family revealed underlying debates about political direction and fiscal reform. Although Kuwait’s political system remains fundamentally stable, the persistence of institutional  friction increases the risk of policy paralysis at a moment when long-term planning is essential. In addition to  this, social tensions also constitute a growing faultline. Youth unemployment, generational expectations for political participation, and the unresolved status of the bidūn (stateless residents) create pressure points that  intersect with broader concerns about economic sustainability. Kuwait’s social contract, notably their  generous public-sector employment and welfare provision funded by oil rents, remains under strain as  demographic pressures rise.

Kuwait in global energy markets and Gulf geoeconomics 

Economically, Kuwait’s significance exceeds its territorial size. It holds approximately 6% of global oil  reserves and remains a reliable supplier for Asian markets, particularly China, Japan, and South Korea. Its stable production policy and commitment to OPEC+ coordination contribute to global energy  market predictability. While Kuwait has been slower than its neighbours to pursue large-scale diversification  or sovereign wealth–driven geoeconomic strategies, its financial reserves, particularly through the Kuwait  Investment Authority, provide a substantial buffer. However, this geoeconomic stability is not guaranteed.  Fiscal debates within parliament have repeatedly stalled major infrastructure and refinery upgrades. The  tension between a population seeking continued welfare benefits and technocratic calls for diversification has  produced a status-quo equilibrium that is politically durable but economically brittle. In the context of the  global energy transition, Kuwait faces a narrowing window to leverage its hydrocarbon wealth into a post-oil  development model. Thus, Kuwait’s role as a quiet stabiliser, anchored in moderate diplomacy  and steady energy supply, is underpinned by internal structures that require careful management if the country  is to maintain its regional significance.

Jordan: Geopolitical Crossroads and the Weight of Structural Burden 

A strategic hinge between regions 

Jordan’s location is both its greatest asset and its perpetual source of vulnerability. Bordered by  Israel/Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, the kingdom sits at the juncture of the Levant, the Gulf, and  the Mediterranean. Historically, it has functioned as a buffer state, a mediator, and a reliable partner for  Western and Gulf powers. As a consequence, Jordan’s geopolitical relevance is anchored in three main roles.  First, it is a custodian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, an influential symbolic position that grants  Amman diplomatic weight in Palestinian-Israeli affairs . Second, it serves as a logistical and  intelligence hub for Western militaries, particularly the United States, which sees Jordan as indispensable in  regional counterterrorism operations. Third, it is often an interlocutor between Gulf monarchies  and Levantine political actors, benefiting from its ability to communicate across ideological divides. These  functions give Jordan an outsized strategic profile relative to its limited material power. But they also expose  it to the spillover effects of every regional crisis, from the Iraq wars and the Syrian civil war to fluctuating  relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Pillar of security cooperation and intelligence networks 

Jordan’s security apparatus is widely considered one of the most capable in the Arab world. The General  Intelligence Directorate (GID) plays a central role in regional counterterrorism, intelligence-sharing, and  border security operations. Its collaboration with the U.S., UK, and GCC states has been pivotal in managing  the threats posed by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Syrian conflict spillover. This reputation for reliability  has solidified Jordan’s position as a “security rentier state,” receiving substantial international support in  exchange for stability provision. However, reliance on external assistance  carries risks. Jordan’s domestic stability to external funding cycles and geopolitical priorities, and it constrains Amman’s policy autonomy, particularly in relation to Israel and the Gulf.

Migration crises, economic, and social pressure 

Arguably, no country in the region other than Lebanon has absorbed a greater demographic shock than Jordan. Waves of Palestinian refugees since 1948, Iraqi refugees after 2003, and more than a million Syrians since 2011 have transformed the country demographically and economically, with refugees now constituting roughly one-third of the population. While Jordan has received considerable international aid, the strains on infrastructure, labour markets, and public services remain acute. Unemployment, especially among youth, hovers at structurally high levels, while rising living costs and subsidy reforms have periodically ignited public protest movements, such as the teacher union strikes of 2019–2020 and repeated demonstrations over fuel prices. Nonetheless, despite these pressures, Jordan’s security institutions have remained resilient. The General Intelligence Directorate and Armed Forces continue to manage border control, counterterrorism, and internal stability without major disruption. However, the demographic and economic strain has reshaped the social fabric, concentrating unemployment and creating latent vulnerabilities that could be exploited by extremist or criminal networks. In effect, while Jordan’s core security apparatus remains robust, the cumulative pressures of mass migration heighten the strategic importance of international support and intelligence cooperation, and underscore the limits of domestic capacity to absorb prolonged demographic shocks.

Jordan’s economic fragility is further compounded by limited natural resources, chronic fiscal deficits, and dependence on foreign aid and remittances. Structural reforms mandated by international financial institutions have sometimes clashed with social realities, generating cycles of austerity-induced tension. Nevertheless, the monarchy has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to navigate discontent through incremental reforms, and co-optation of tribal and elite networks.

Kuwait and Jordan occupy peripheral positions in Middle Eastern geopolitical discourse, yet they perform  essential stabilising functions. Kuwait acts as a diplomatic mediator and a predictable energy supplier, even  as its internal political gridlock and slow economic reform pose long-term risks. Jordan anchors regional  security cooperation and humanitarian burden-sharing, while contending with economic precarity and  demographic pressures of historic magnitude. Both states illustrate a paradox of Middle Eastern politics:  strategic centrality without overt power projection. Their contributions to regional order are often quiet, but  no less essential for that quietness. As the Middle East continues to grapple with shifting alliances, ongoing  conflicts, and the socioeconomic ramifications of global transitions, the resilience of Kuwait and Jordan will  remain an indispensable, if understated, component of regional stability.