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Strategic Competition and Conflict in the Indo-Pacific

The growing strategic competition between the People’s Republic of China and the United States has become a central concern for policymakers worldwide. While this rivalry spans multiple domains, the most pressing issue is the potential for armed conflict. Analysts have therefore focused on identifying flashpoints - particularly Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula - where tensions could escalate into full-scale war. This report outlines the likely areas of conflict in the Indo-Pacific and the steps the United States may take in response.


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U.S. Strategic Priorities: Taiwan and North Korea


Two primary scenarios define U.S. military planning in the Indo-Pacific: a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan and aggression from North Korea. Although distinct, these scenarios are interconnected; North Korea may act opportunistically if China initiates hostilities.

In response, the United States seeks to bolster its forward presence in the region through deployment of personnel, equipment, and logistics infrastructure among key allies.


Japan and South Korea: Strategic Anchors


Under the Biden administration, the U.S. emphasized stronger defense ties with Japan and South Korea through initiatives such as the Quad, AUKUS, and trilateral security pacts. However, the second Trump administration has introduced new dynamics that risk complicating these relationships.

Economic tariffs and renewed demands for greater defense burden sharing - particularly the push for allies to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP - have caused tension. Domestic political instability, such as the ousting of South Korea’s former president Yoon Suk Yeol ahead of June 3 elections, further complicates these relationships.

Despite these factors, the U.S. aims to continue strategic deployments to counter threats from China and North Korea.


Forward Basing for Taiwan Contingencies


In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. strategy will emphasize forward deployment in the Southwest Japanese Islands and the northern Philippines. If conditions deteriorate and access to these forward areas is denied, fallback positions in Guam (within the "Second Island Chain") may be used. However, the distance from Guam limits rapid response capability, underscoring the importance of regional allies, especially Japan and the Philippines, in early conflict phases.

To prevent this worst-case scenario, the U.S. is focused on maintaining basing rights in Japan and deepening operational integration with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Japan’s creation of the Joint Operations Command (JJOC) represents a key step, though further integration has been stalled by the Trump administration’s halting of U.S. Forces Japan expansion.


Japan: Operational Integration and Industrial Cooperation


Operational integration with the JSDF remains a priority. In addition to personnel coordination, joint development and deployment of defense platforms - such as anti-ship and hypersonic missiles - are central to mutual burden sharing.

Japan could also expand its support role by hosting logistics, repair, and support facilities for U.S. platforms. These moves would bolster Japan’s own defense posture and offer political cover for the U.S. to maintain or expand regional deployments.


South Korea: Deterrence and Strategic Support


For South Korea, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan poses an indirect but significant threat, given that the Taiwan Strait is vital to its trade and energy supply. However, North Korean aggression would likely prevent South Korean forces from directly assisting in Taiwan’s defense.

The expected response to a Taiwan contingency would primarily come from the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines, followed by broader involvement from Australia, ASEAN, India, and others. South Korea’s role would be to contain North Korean threats with the support of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

While South Korea may be reluctant to allow its territory to be used as a staging ground for operations against China, this could be offset by deploying additional missile defense systems such as HIMARS. South Korea’s advanced defense industrial base—and world-class shipbuilding sector—also offers long-term advantages for U.S. naval strategy, including fleet expansion and in-theater repair capacity.


Doctrinal Lessons from Wargaming


A key reference for U.S. planning is the 2023 CSIS wargame “The First Battle of the Next War,” which simulated 24 iterations of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Most scenarios ended in Chinese failure, but only when the U.S. could conduct operations from Japanese bases.

The wargame emphasized the importance of hardening airbases in Japan and Guam to withstand missile attacks, sustaining bomber and submarine operations, and ensuring logistical resilience despite high attrition rates.


Strategic Implications for U.S. Force Deployment


The wargame and related analysis highlight key imperatives:

  • Japan: Continued U.S. presence in Japan is critical. Base fortification, deeper integration with JSDF, and robust forward-deployed logistics will be essential. In the event of hostilities, the U.S. and Japan must be capable of rapid joint operations, especially in the first days of a Taiwan invasion.

  • South Korea: Although not a frontline actor in a Taiwan contingency, South Korea's role remains vital for regional stability. North Korean deterrence must be sustained, and South Korean infrastructure may serve as a valuable support network for U.S. operations, provided political sensitivities are managed.

The U.S. must also consider long-term strategic goals, such as leveraging South Korean industrial capabilities to expand naval production and logistics. Doing so would not only strengthen alliance ties but also help meet Pentagon objectives of achieving fleet parity with the Chinese navy.


Conclusion


The growing threat from a more assertive China - particularly the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan - requires the United States to recalibrate its military posture in the Indo-Pacific. While political changes in Washington and among regional allies may complicate defense diplomacy, the strategic imperatives are clear.

The U.S. must reinforce its position in Japan through expanded integration, logistics capacity, and base fortification. South Korea, though geographically removed from Taiwan, remains indispensable as a partner in regional deterrence and industrial support. These measures, supported by doctrinal lessons and wargaming insights, form the basis for a credible U.S. strategy to manage and potentially contain conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

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