The European Union as a Swing Power in Great-PowerCompetition

As rivalry between the United States and China increasingly shapes the international system, much of the analytical focus has centered on military capabilities, alliance structures, and ideological competition. Yet one of the most consequential actors in this evolving landscape is neither Washington nor Beijing, but Brussels. The European Union is not a traditional great power, nor does it seek to become one. Instead, it is emerging as a global swing state which will be referred to as a ‘swing power’ in this article, an actor whose alignment choices, regulatory authority, and economic weight can meaningfully influence the trajectory of great-power competition without full strategic alignment to either side.

This role is not accidental. It reflects both Europe’s structural constraints and its comparative advantages. In an era defined less by territorial conquest than by economic leverage, technological control, and standards-setting, the EU’s capacity to shape outcomes lies precisely in its ability to tilt the strategic environment rather than dominate it.

What Makes a Swing Power

A swing power is not defined by overwhelming military force. Rather, it is an actor whose cooperation or resistance can alter strategic calculations for larger powers. Swing powers retain flexibility, extract leverage from ambiguity, and influence competition through selective alignment rather than permanent allegiance. The EU fits this profile unusually well. It is the world’s largest single market, a regulatory superpower, and a central node in global trade, finance, and technology ecosystems. While it lacks unified military command and remains dependent on NATO, and by extension the United States, for hard security, its economic and normative influence grants it a form of power that neither Washington nor Beijing can ignore.

In a world increasingly divided along economic and technological lines, choice matters as much as force. Europe’s choices shape market access, supply-chain resilience, and the legitimacy of international norms.

De-Risking as Strategic Positioning

Perhaps the clearest expression of the EU’s swing power role is its embrace of “de-risking” rather than decoupling from China. Unlike Washington, which has increasingly framed economic disengagement as a security imperative, Brussels has rejected a binary logic that would force a clean break with Beijing. Instead, the EU seeks to reduce critical vulnerabilities, particularly in semiconductors, energy, pharmaceuticals, and raw materials, while maintaining trade and investment where risks are deemed manageable.

This approach serves multiple strategic functions. It constrains U.S. efforts to consolidate a rigid economic bloc by refusing to fully align with American industrial and export-control strategies. At the same time, it signals to China that access to European markets is conditional rather than guaranteed. Engagement remains possible, but it is no longer unconditional. In doing so, the EU helps prevent the global system from collapsing into hardened camps. This is not neutrality; it is managed alignment, designed to preserve European autonomy while shaping the environment in which competition unfolds.

Regulation as Geopolitical Leverage

The EU’s most distinctive source of geopolitical power lies in its regulatory capacity. As Anu Bradford (2020) famously conceptualized in The Brussels Effect, the EU’s internal regulations often externalize globally, shaping corporate behavior and market standards far beyond Europe’s borders without the need for coercion or military enforcement.

This phenomenon is increasingly visible in areas central to great-power competition. European rules on data protection, competition policy, environmental standards, foreign subsidies, and investment screening are no longer merely internal governance tools. Measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), digital regulation, and export controls on sensitive technologies impose compliance costs that multinational firms—whether American or Chinese—must absorb if they wish to access the EU market. The result is structural leverage. For Chinese companies, compliance with EU standards is often the price of continued access to a critical export market. For American firms, EU regulation increasingly constrains global business models that originate in the United States. In both cases, Brussels influences behavior without issuing ultimatums or deploying military assets. This is power exercised structurally rather than transactionally. In effect, Brussels shapes the rules of competition even when it is not the primary security actor.

The geopolitical value of the Brussels Effect lies in its non-aligned nature. Unlike sanctions or security commitments, regulatory power does not require explicit strategic alignment. The EU can impose costs, shape incentives, and constrain options while maintaining diplomatic ambiguity. Thus, regulation becomes a form of non-coercive hard power, one particularly well suited to a swing power. It allows the EU to influence outcomes, constrain strategic options, and impose costs without explicit alignment or confrontation.

Selective Alignment with the United States

Europe’s relationship with the United States further illustrates its swing role. The EU has aligned closely with Washington on major issues such as sanctions against Russia, support for Ukraine, and the defense of maritime trade routes. These alignments reinforce U.S. strategic objectives while lending them multilateral legitimacy.

Yet alignment remains selective. European leaders have resisted U.S. extraterritorial sanctions, pushed back against industrial policies perceived as discriminatory, most notably under the Inflation Reduction Act, and maintained independent diplomatic engagement with Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Rather than functioning as a subordinate ally, the EU positions itself as a conditional partner, reinforcing U.S. power where interests converge while preserving room for divergence. This dynamic enhances Europe’s leverage. The EU strengthens the U.S.-led order without surrendering the ability to shape its evolution.

Strategic Ambiguity Toward China

The EU’s China policy is often criticized as incoherent, but its ambiguity is deliberate. By labeling China simultaneously a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, Brussels preserves strategic flexibility. Engagement continues alongside risk mitigation; dialogue persists alongside defensive measures.

This ambiguity serves two purposes. First, it prevents Beijing from framing Europe as irrevocably hostile, preserving diplomatic and economic leverage. Second, it allows the EU to calibrate responses as conditions change, rather than locking itself into positions that may prove unsustainable. In a competitive environment defined by uncertainty, ambiguity can be an asset, provided it is backed by credible action.

The Limits of Europe’s Swing Power

The EU’s swing role is not without constraints. Internal fragmentation remains a persistent weakness. Member states differ sharply in their economic exposure to China, threat perceptions, and willingness to absorb political risk. Unanimity requirements further slow decision-making, undermining Europe’s ability to act decisively at critical moments. Security dependence also limits credibility. As long as Europe relies on U.S. military power to secure its trade routes and territorial defense, its autonomy will remain partial. Swing power requires not only leverage, but the ability to sustain pressure when choices become costly. Finally, there is a risk of over-hedging. If Europe delays alignment too long in moments that demand clarity, both Washington and Beijing may cease to treat it as pivotal. Swing power depends on decisive moments, not perpetual hesitation.

Why the EU Still Matters

Despite these limitations, the EU’s geopolitical significance is real. It shapes the rules of global economic competition, legitimizes multilateral responses to coercion, and offers middle and smaller states an alternative to binary alignment. In an increasingly polarized system, Europe acts as a stabilizing force, not by dominating outcomes, but by influencing the terms on which competition occurs. In this sense, the EU’s power lies not in becoming another great power, but in refusing to be absorbed by one.

Conclusion

The European Union is unlikely to rival the United States or China in military terms. But it does not need to. As a swing power, Europe’s influence derives from its ability to tilt strategic balances, shape global norms, and preserve optionality in an era of rivalry.

In great-power competition, dominance is rare. Influence, by contrast, is cumulative. By wielding its economic weight, regulatory authority, and strategic ambiguity with intent, the EU has positioned itself as one of the most consequential actors in the emerging global order, not by choosing sides prematurely, but by shaping the choices available to others.