The Middle Corridor Without the Romance: Real Bottlenecks from the Caspian to theBlack Sea

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or the Middle Corridor (MC), connects China to the European Union through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. Although not the sole option to for moving goods between Asia and Europe, this multimodal transport route received growing attention following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As international sanctions reshaped trade alignments and disrupted global supply chains, countries began seeking alternatives to avoid the North Corridor, which runs through Russia. Despite the Middle Corridor’s potential benefits for trade diversification, regional cooperation, and geopolitical autonomy, the growing volume of freight has revealed deep-rooted infrastructure issues that question its competitiveness and long-term viability.

Despite its current role as an alternative to the preferred North Corridor, the Middle Corridor has the potential to enhance Europe’s supply-chain resilience and strengthen ties between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. For countries along the route, it offers greater geopolitical relevance, regional autonomy from Russia, and trade diversification. Economically, the corridor can attract foreign investment and dramatically boost the region’s revenue. Nonetheless, reaching these objectives requires more than political will. Transforming the MC into a competitive and viable long-term alternative requires the key players, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to overcome structural bottlenecks, improve infrastructure, and tackle coordination challenges that currently overshadow the route’s potential capabilities.

The MC begins in China, where goods are transported by rail freight through Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea ports of Aktau and Kuryk. While still on Kazakhstan’s territory, the goods are transferred to maritime vessels for sea transport. The cargo then arrives in Azerbaijan’s Baku port, continues its land journey through Georgia, and reaches the Black Sea Ports of Poti and Batumi before finally reaching Europe via Turkey or by sea transit.

Given its multimodal nature, incorporating maritime, rail, and road passes, the Middle Corridor faces severe management and coordination challenges, as well as limited transport capacity. Problems range from high costs, delays, and shortages to logistics, technology, and connectivity. Understanding MC’s bottlenecks and constraints requires a deeper dive into the problematic areas, which are often made more difficult by the lack of up-to-date, relevant data. However, following the war, increased attention to the Middle Corridor and its importance to the region led institutions such as the World Bank, OECD, and EBRD to publish reports, analyses, and advice on successfully transforming the MC.

Understanding the Real Bottlenecks  

Ports play a large role in the operations of the Middle Corridor. At the same time, their poor operational efficiency contributes to congestion, long waiting times, and unpredictability. Despite some infrastructure expansions, Kazakhstan’s ports of Aktau and Kuryk have become significant bottlenecks due to their limited effective capacity. Combined, the two ports in Kazakhstan amount to around 21Mt of nominal capacity per year, but in fact operate well below this level. According to World Bank data, Aktau operates at less than 30% of its overall capacity, meaning that the ports themselves are not physically congested. In theory, these ports should be able to handle more cargo arriving via the Middle Corridor. In reality, however, bottlenecks emerge despite low utilization rates due to the lack of effective intermodal interfaces between rail, road, and ferry services, outdated and insufficient transshipment equipment, and slow container-handling processes, resulting in long loading and waiting times. A more in-depth look at Kazakhstan’s ports reveals that Aktau's infrastructure is also outdated. OECD’s investigation into the bottlenecks highlighted even more nuanced problems, such as the need for modern, large cranes and the necessity of reliable loading equipment to avoid waiting times. Because these ports lack efficient transshipment equipment and predictable maritime services, they become congested as cargo accumulates while awaiting maritime transport. As a result of these limitations, only around 6Mt of additional annual cargo from the North Corridor can be realistically absorbed by Kazakhstan. For the private sector, this reality does present the Middle Corridor as an attractive alternative.

Unfortunately, these operational bottlenecks do not stop on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. The inefficiencies continue at Azerbaijan’s Baku-Alat port and even worsen due to asymmetries in port capacity on either side of the Caspian Sea. The port of Baku-Alat also faces slow container flows and operational issues, with transit times ranging anywhere from 10 to 46 days, accounting for around 70% of the average time for shipping along the Middle Corridor. Azerbaijan is also challenged by slow ship-to-shore handling equipment at the multi-purpose terminals and long customs inspections. The situation is exacerbated by poor communication between port personnel and sea-level fluctuations, which make vessel navigation in such conditions challenging. Altogether, these problems reduce the port’s throughput efficiency and materialize as another bottleneck that risks the MC’s competitiveness in the long run.

As cargo leaves Azerbaijan’s ports, it is loaded onto railcars and sent to Georgia. In fact, Azerbaijan and Georgia have both invested in modernizing their railway systems to facilitate the movement of goods. However, the railway connection to Georgia still remains a critical bottleneck. A substantial part of the problem is that the stations on the Georgian and Azerbaijani sides were never designed to act as border stations, therefore limiting their infrastructure development capabilities. As a result, the Red Bridge crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia experiences persistent congestion. Its capacity is limited by insufficient passing lines, the lack of secure customs clearance areas, and even inadequate inspection facilities on both sides. Although the connecting railway line from the port of Alat to Georgian ports is electrified and double-track, its worsened conditions limit capacity to fewer than 25 fully loaded trains. On the Georgian side, locomotive shortages and infrastructure limits constrain rail throughput, particularly on the Batumi branch, where capacity is limited to around seven trains per day, forcing majority of the containers to be transported by truck, while flows toward Poti are hindered mainly by port–rail interface.

The two Georgian ports face high container dwell times, averaging around 10 days, largely due to poor connectivity between container yards and road or rail transfers. In Poti, inadequate navigation channels, exposed to winds and siltation, further slow operations. Tariffs and cargo handling costs are also high compared to other ports, with a 40-foot container costing about $275 in Poti and $430 in Batumi, partly reflecting the port operator's monopoly in Poti. These factors combine to make Georgia’s ports slower and more expensive than comparable ports along the Middle Corridor, adding another layer of bottlenecks to the route.

A close analysis of where the Middle Corridor slows down reveals that the route suffers from poor infrastructure, inefficient port operational capacity, a lack of corridor coordination, and unstandardized information technology solutions. There is a substantial divide in data flows that hinders smooth operationalization on the MC, resulting in most of the delays discussed in this piece. Without proper reforms and resolution of the problematic junctures in the MC, the corridor will remain challenged by long cargo transfer delays, fluctuating costs, and inconsistent scheduling.

On a more positive note, the governments of Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan have recognized the potential of the MC and invested in infrastructure to address bottlenecks along the route. The three countries are investing in modernization projects, while Azerbaijan is working to improve its Baku port to handle more cargo. The collaborative efforts also include creating smoother customs processes and reducing delays. Still, substantial changes are necessary for the MC to become a strong competitor to its existing alternatives, such as the Maritime, Northern, and Southern routes. According to the World Bank assessment, if countries along the MC implement corridor-wide governance that transcends national boundaries, digitizes data flows, coordinates procedures across railways and customs, and targets infrastructure investments to eradicate critical operational bottlenecks, the route can triple cargo volumes and halve transport time by 2030. Evidently, given the reorganization of global supply chains and the international sanctions, now is the ripe time for the Middle Corridor to become more efficient and reliable. While the three countries have recognized the need for long-term investments in infrastructure development and digitalization, more short- and medium-term progress is needed.

A Geopolitical Outlook

While the economic benefits of improving the MC are evident for trade diversification and regional coordination among the involved countries, the MC's geopolitical leverage is significant. The MC provides ex-Soviet countries an opportunity to distance themselves from Russia-dominated transit routes and offers them greater geopolitical autonomy. The interest of the European Union, in alignment with institutions such as the World Bank and EBRD, also reflects the strategic move to counterbalance Russian influence along transit routes for energy, critical materials, and freight. China views the MC as an integral part of its Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at reducing reliance on Russian transit and opening new avenues to access European markets. Even though the corridor remains burdened with bottlenecks and operational problems, it allows countries to protect against geopolitical shocks and to integrate more firmly into Eurasian connectivity architectures. On a national level, the ex-Soviet countries have an even greater motivation to reduce reliance on Russia and gain greater autonomy by reorienting towards the European Union.

As the Middle Corridor continues to evolve, its success will be shaped not only by infrastructure investments and cross-border cooperation but also by the ability of participating countries to foster trust and transparency. The efforts to improve the corridor cannot be successful without cross-country collaboration and foreign investments.  Building robust institutions, streamlining customs and regulatory procedures, and encouraging public-private partnerships will be crucial for unlocking the route’s full potential and lies in the interest of all participating countries. Ultimately, the Middle Corridor stands as both a test and an opportunity for the region’s leaders to demonstrate collective vision and pragmatic action in advancing economic prosperity and regional stability. It also stands as a window of opportunity for the countries to express their political alignments and hedge against unwanted influences.