The U.S. Grand Strategy: Is Containment Coming Back?

Introduction

President Biden’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in October 2022 signaled a new rivalry-driven strategic stance for the United States by framing Russia as a “revanchist power” and characterizing China as a “pacing challenge” (O’Rourke 2023). Using a deterrence stance reminiscent of the Cold War, Biden has repeatedly said, “We’re not looking for conflict, but we are prepared to defend Taiwan if necessary” (Brunnstrom and Hunnicutt 2022). A crucial question is raised by these remarks, as well as growing diplomatic and legislative efforts against China and Russia: is the U.S. returning to a containment strategy that was first developed in the early stages of the Cold War to stop Soviet expansion?

Typically, the phrase “containment” evokes the Truman Doctrine, a worldwide coordinated plan of military alliances, economic assistance, and ideological counteroffensive, as well as George Kennan’s 1947 “Long Telegram” (History.state.gov n.d.). However, there are several notable differences between the current U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia agendas. In order to adapt to a multipolar world characterized by globalization, interdependence, and technological complexity, this article examines whether current U.S. actions represent containment in appearance, intention, and design, or if they indicate a recalculated grand strategy that combines deterrence, competition, and selective cooperation.

I. Containment and the Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is fundamentally about coordinating national resources, including diplomatic, economic, and military ones, in order to accomplish long-term security goals (Posen and Ross 1996). Three ideal kinds have historically been used by academics to characterize U.S. grand strategy: restraint (limited global participation), liberal internationalism (rules-based order), and realism (balance of power).

George Kennan’s concept of containment, which was made effective by the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, was not only military. To reduce Soviet influence, it used clandestine operations, alliance organizations (SEATO, NATO), and financial assistance (History.state.gov n.d.). Crucially, in a bipolar world, it depended on a single industrial foundation and ideological front.

U.S. strategists embraced “liberal hegemony” after 1991, which holds that American dominance and liberal order will advance world peace and prosperity (Ikenberry 2002). Post-Cold War interventions and initiatives to bring China and Russia into a rules-based system were the results of that policy. The traditional concept of containment seems archaic. However, echoes of it are resurfacing in the context of increasing strategic competition. Whether these are intentional, planned revivals or rhetorical relapses is the question.

II. A Strategic Drift After the Cold War

The United States pursued liberal hegemony through globalization, military adventures, and democracy following the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this strategy failed to develop a cohesive grand design and instead led to what Barry Posen called “strategic overreach”—in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans (Posen 2014). Posen’s “restraint” school of thought holds that putting the defense of vital allies first would have better protected American dominance.

President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” reframed American strategic focus in reaction to China’s ascent, but it was still narrowly focused and lacked coherence (CNA 2021). Though they lacked a solid plan, initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and increased military diplomacy demonstrated awareness.

Only after China’s maritime assertiveness and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 did U.S. leaders explicitly shift their grand strategy toward competitive containment, though they did not yet call it that (Mead 2014).

III. Strategic Competition with China: A New Containment?

For the first time in a U.S. strategic document, the 2022 NSS categorically refers to China as the “pacing challenge” (FPRI 2022). China’s military might is cited as a major danger in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (Department of Defense 2022). This is an indication of containment politics wrapped in diplomatic courtesy for Beijing.

The military aspect: The trilateral security agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, known as AUKUS, calls for the sharing of nuclear submarine technology. Biden is in favor of it; domestic critics worry about the unity of the alliance (Wall Street Journal 2025).

Quad: The United States, Japan, India, and Australia are progressively coordinating cyber-collaborations and military exercises (CNA 2021).

Base presence and expansion: Cold War basing is mirrored by U.S. forces moving to Guam, the Philippines, and under diplomatic access agreements.

Economic-tech dimension: Export restrictions and the CHIPS and Science Act represent industrial containment by denying China access to cutting-edge semiconductors and artificial intelligence technology (Wikipedia 2025a). Global supply chains have friction as a result of partial economic decoupling, particularly in the technology sector (Reuters 2025).

Digital/ideological dimension: Concerns about technology impact and digital confinement are reflected in tech bans on Huawei and limitations on data-sharing websites like TikTok (Wikipedia 2025b).

The U.S. and its allies are accused of “containment and suppression” by China’s leadership in a defensive response (PRC Leader 2023; USNWC 2023). However, rhetorical charges are not the same as strategy; it is still up for debate whether American policies amount to a coordinated plan on par with Kennan’s. The new containment strategy seems to be modular: digital in the cyber/ideological spheres, economic in the tech sector, and military in the Indo-Pacific.

IV. Russia

NATO became the focal point of U.S.-European containment operations when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These efforts included troop deployment in Eastern Europe, increased military drills, and large armament deliveries (NATO 2022). Although it is more decentralized and alliance-led than a direct U.S. commitment, Washington’s support for Ukraine is similar to Cold War-era proxy support (Department of Defense 2025).

However, Russia is viewed as a regional disruptor rather than a worldwide ideological danger, in contrast to the Soviet Union. Instead of the worldwide forward-posturing of the NATO deployments of the 1980s, the U.S. containment posture is defensive, reactive, and in line with requests from allies.

V. A Comparison Between Cold War Containment and 21st-Century Containment

Economic interdependence: During the Cold War, comparatively closed economies were contained. China is a major trading partner nowadays. Total decoupling would splinter allies and jeopardize Western prosperity (Peacediplomacy.org 2021).

Multipolarity: The post-Cold War globe is home to regional powers with shifting allegiances, such as Brazil, India, and Gulf nations. The current global architecture is flexible and networked, in contrast to the Warsaw Pact and NATO (AEI 2024).

Technological domains: In a move Kennan never anticipated, containment today encompasses distinct strategic domains like semiconductors, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and digital infrastructure (Quincy Institute 2023).

Alliance structure: AUKUS and Quad have a different alliance structure and architecture than NATO; they are pillar-based, flexible, and informal (InternationalAffairs.org.au 2024). Another significant distinction from containment during the Cold War is that they represent coalitions of convenience with specific objectives rather than broad alliances that provide mutual defense.

Ideology vs. interests: Whereas China and Russia reject the term, the current U.S. framework places a strong emphasis on protecting a “free and open international order,” whereas Kennan spoke of safeguarding democracy. In comparison to strategic competitiveness, the ideological component is underemphasized (Ikenberry 2011).

VI. Critiques

Escalation risk: Beijing warns of instability as Canberra criticizes U.S. pressure on allies like Australia to contribute militarily (Reuters 2025; Lowy Institute 2025a). Modular containment runs the possibility of degenerating into wider conflict, particularly with relation to Taiwan.

Alliance blowback: The incoming U.S. administration’s “America First” rhetoric prompted Pentagon investigations of AUKUS, which have damaged coalition confidence (Wall Street Journal 2025; Guardian 2025). Fragility in alignment is shown by the EU’s concern over complete tech decoupling.

Cost and overextension: Analysts caution about U.S. capacity constraints, Australian submarine cost overruns, and soaring expenses (SAN.com 2025). Without strategic clarity, competing fronts risk diluting resources.

Scholarly criticisms: Barry Posen’s “restraint” paradigm advises the United States to avoid globalizing every regional issue and instead concentrate on its primary dangers (Boston Review 2024). John Mearsheimer contends that the United States’ rivalry with China, particularly its interventionism in Taiwan, is provocative and raises the possibility of conflict (Mearsheimer 2022). According to G. John Ikenberry, containment runs the risk of destroying the liberal order on which the United States established and relied (Ikenberry 2011).