Will Takaichi’s Stunning Snap Election Victory Push Sino-Japanese Relations to the Brink?

To the international community’s surprise, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi won a landslide victory in her high-stakes gamble of a snap election, successfully translating her immense popularity into a record-breaking majority for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the lower house of Japan’s parliament—the largest seat total since the party’s inception in 1955. Following this outright victory, Takaichi now possesses a strong mandate and an unusual degree of latitude to accelerate military spending, expand economic stimulus, and—hitting Beijing’s sensitive nerve—revise the pacifist constitution. She is specifically targeting Article 9, which was imposed after World War II prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military or going to war. The revision was last attempted by Takaichi’s mentor, Shinzo Abe, in 2017 but failed due to significant opposition.

The timing could not be trickier. While China has been celebrating the Spring Festival (Lunar New Year), the most important holiday in China and many other Asian communities, ironically, during the broadcast of the Spring Festival Gala (“Chunwan”), there was a special folk art segment featuring General Qi Jiguang, China’s national hero famous for defeating Japanese pirates in the Ming dynasty. Furthermore, last month at Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo, two giant pandas returned to China, leaving Japan without any Chinese pandas for the first time since 1972 when Tokyo and Beijing normalized diplomatic ties. This marks a significant pause in “panda diplomacy” amid deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations. Last but not least, in the global geopolitical arena, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi took an exceptionally hard line at the recently concluded Munich Security Conference, invoking Japan’s World War II history of aggression while warning Takaichi against a return to militarism as he blasted her Taiwan contingency statement, labelling it as a “direct violation of China’s territorial sovereignty” and “a very dangerous development in Asia.” 

Wang’s remarks echoed China’s official response to Takaichi’s historic win, that 1) China’s fundamental policy towards Japan would not change based on a single election; 2) Beijing would continue to demand Takaichi to retract her Taiwan comments; 3) Beijing has urged Japan to adhere to a path of peaceful development and expressed concerns regarding Takaichi’s potential visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Despite the anti-militarism rhetoric, China’s red line is clear: Taiwan. Last November, Takaichi explicitly suggested that Japan would intervene militarily if China sought to take self-ruled Taiwan by force. Since then, Beijing has enacted a slate of restrictions on Tokyo, advising its citizens against traveling to Japan and tightening export controls on dual-use items, including critical rare-earth minerals. Nevertheless, Takaichi’s refusal to back down is believed to have further boosted her popularity, ultimately paving the way for the LDP’s landslide triumph. 

Whether Takaichi’s consolidated power will lead to greater stability, or a new era of geopolitical strain remains unclear; however, it may be worth looking back at history to tease out clues or patterns. The last round of severely strained Sino-Japanese relations dates back to 2012, when the Japanese government purchased three privately owned islands in the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain, over which both countries claimed sovereignty. The move triggered a rare wave of anti-Japanese protests and consumer boycotts across China, along with intensified Chinese naval patrols and maritime confrontations. Then-PM Abe’s warning that Japan would “expel by force” any Chinese landing on the islands, combined with his high-profile 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, pushed bilateral relations to the verge of rupture. Yet just as the regional narrative was shifting toward the possibility of war, the two countries made a U-turn. They reopened communication channels after President Xi and PM Abe met at the 2014 APEC summit in Beijing, agreeing to halt the escalation and improve relations. This diplomatic thaw immediately stabilized economic ties—notably, Chinese tourism to Japan nearly quadrupled, rising from approximately 2.4 million in 2014 to a record 9.6 million in 2019.

Now, the forthright question is: will Takaichi differ from her mentor and predecessor, Abe, regarding Sino-Japanese relations? Or will we see a resurgence of the Diaoyu Islands dispute alongside a potential détente at this year’s APEC summit, which coincidentally will be held in China again after 12 years? The short answer is: it depends on Takaichi’s commitment to Taiwan, which is the most distinct difference between her government and her mentor’s, given that Abe’s Yasukuni Shrine visit did not further ruffle the feathers of China, nor did his hawkish constitutional reform get public support or endorsements from neighboring countries—particularly South Korea, which shares many of the same unresolved historical disputes with Japan as China’s. 

Regarding the Taiwan “red line”, Takaichi may require external support, namely from the US, which has been tactically playing a balancing act in the region. It is foreseeable that the Taiwan dilemma will be a central focus during Takaichi’s planned visit to the White House in late March, roughly two weeks before Trump’s state visit to China. This might help explain why President Xi reaffirmed Taiwan as “the most important issue” in Sino-US relations during his phone call with Trump in early February. His warning was not merely a response to the recent US arms sales, but also an attempt to influence the strategic guidance the US might offer its closest Asian ally. If Trump chooses to prioritize his “excellent” relationship with Xi, Takaichi may be forced to reassess whether retracting her Taiwan statement best serves Japan’s national interest.