Peripheral Fault Lines: State Control and Fragmentation Risks in Iran

On Saturday, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated attack on Iran, eliminating high-value targets in an attempt to topple the regime that has been in place since 1979. While much of the discussion has centred around the legality of the action or the path to succession, one point is often neglected: how will a state so diverse find the common ground needed to take its next step? 

Looking at Iran mainly through the last fifty years risks missing how the system actually works, especially at a time when military strikes, deterrence signals, and regional escalation are reshaping the environment, and when it increasingly appears that parts of the country’s elites are being systematically targeted. Iran is not only a post-1979 political order but a country with more than 5,000 years of historical continuity, where identity, territory, and power have been negotiated over long cycles. Ethnicity remains a key part of this picture. Persians are the main cultural and administrative reference, but large groups such as Iranian Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluch are firmly integrated into the state and society, including within the elite itself. These communities do not react in the same way to pressure on the center, and moments of elite loss or fragmentation can be interpreted very differently across regions. 

The Khuzestan region, of predominantly Arab population, was a key theatre in the 1980s war with Iraq. However, since then the highly centralized government of Tehran has frequently exploited the region’s natural resources without adequately investing in its development, leading to growing resentment. Tensions reached a boiling point in 2021 over water scarcity issues, prompting the government to respond with a combination of violence and coercion. Given the built up resentment, separatist factions in the region may decide to take advantage of the power vacuum in Tehran. 

Another key ethnic group, the Kurds, has also been deeply repressed by the regime in Tehran. During the Islamic revolution, the region initially sided with the revolutionaries with the hope that they would be able to recover some of the power and autonomy that had been lost during the Pahlavi dynasty. Over the years, the group has faced financial and social discrimination by the governing Persian community, with Ayatollah Khomeini going as far as calling their leader “the evil of the Earth”. These grievances, combined with the discrimination faced by Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, may lead the ethnic group to take matters into their own hands and create their own autonomic government. 

Geography adds another layer. A mountainous country shaped by the Zagros and Alborz ranges has never been governed smoothly from one point, and distance from Tehran often translates into different expectations about authority and loyalty. This becomes especially relevant when leadership structures are weakened, because local networks and identities tend to gain weight. Therefore, while the top prize of Tehran is bound to be the focus of the future government - and the international community looking to influence its composition, previously fringe groups can use this moment to establish themselves as key players in the periphery. This would make it more challenging for a future government to establish state authority in more rural areas, giving further legitimacy to separatist movements. 

Education also matters. Decades of a national narrative centered on the Persian language and historical experience have strengthened a shared sense of Iranian identity for many, while leaving unresolved tensions around language and cultural space for others. In this context, the strategic question is not simply whether Iran will remain stable, but how long-term ethnic, geographic, and cultural factors interact with short-term military pressure and the erosion of elite continuity. Analyses focused only on recent politics or military developments risk overlooking the deeper forces that shape both resilience and limits to control. As Iran seeks to rebuild, a new central government may try and change this national narrative to ingratiate itself with the groups currently in the periphery, making it easier for them to establish a strong and durable state presence while fending off the threats of neighboring countries seeking their opportunity to increase their regional standing. 

In sum, while much of the discourse surrounding the situation in Iran has centered around barrages of missiles and the prospect of a new revolution, understanding the motivations and past of the key players can help predict what they will do in the future. Will ethnic groups previously on the fringes of political decision-making take advantage of the power vacuum to further their interests, or will a new government attempt to appease as many stakeholders as possible to ensure a quick consolidation of power? 

Co-authored by Alberto Vaccari and Pablo Mustienes